

FBIS

DAILY REPORT

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Soviet Union

Vol III No 213

4 November 1986

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ARBATOV QUESTIONS U.S. INTENTIONS IN REYKJAVIK

PM031707 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Academician G. Arbatov article: "The Echo of Reykjavik: 20 Days Later"]

[Text] There is one question among the many raised around the Reykjavik meeting in which the world public is keenly interested: Why did the USSR and the United States fail to reach an historic accord which would have delivered mankind from the nuclear threat? Was it because they failed to agree on the single issue of where research on and testing of "Star Wars" weapons would be permitted in the next few years -- only inside laboratories or also outside? Or were there some more serious and more profound causes?

I do not wish to accuse those who hold the first viewpoint of shortsightedness or superficiality. There is too strong a desire to end the nuclear threat and begin a normal life, like the almost forgotten life in which there were no fears about the sudden destruction of human civilization. That is why there was such a strong desire to believe that accord had almost been reached, that it was within grasp -- that all that was left was to agree on some seemingly technical details. Honestly speaking, I would very much like to think so. But that is becoming increasingly difficult.

Doubts began arising even in Reykjavik. Let us suppose that, as far as the U.S. president was concerned, of absolutely paramount importance -- greater than that of the liquidation of nuclear weapons -- was the question of where and how the components of ABM weapons close to his heart but still existing only on the drawing board would be tested in the coming decades. Why was it, if that was the case, that he did not even ask: What does the Soviet side understand by the word "laboratory"? Why was it that this question was not asked by U.S. experts of the Soviet experts during the discussion that went on throughout the night?

Doubts increased further still in the light of the administration's words and deeds following Reykjavik, starting with the attempt, while lauding Reykjavik (after all, congressional elections are just around the corner), to simultaneously "dismantle" even what seemed to have been agreed. Moreover, to "dismantle" not some petty details but the actual essence. It was declared, in particular, that the President apparently agreed on the reduction and liquidation of ballistic missiles only, not of all strategic weapons.

This, to put it mildly, is an untruth. I have before me a copy of the document containing the Soviet proposals, which was handed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to U.S. President R. Reagan, and which was discussed in detail by Soviet and U.S. experts (my copy contains all the amendments and annotations, and I have kept it, as a participant in those discussions). It deals with strategic weapons in black and white. Matters are concretized right down to the quantity of delivery vehicles and warheads. As for the summit conversations, a responsible spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry has already cited the relevant statement by R. Reagan himself, testifying to the fact that there was discussion of the liquidation of nuclear weapons and not only of ballistic missiles.

Why lie now? One automatically draws the conclusion that the reason rests in the fact that, following Reykjavik, the U.S. leadership has gone back on its word either of its own accord or because it has been forced to do so. [paragraph continues]

I am afraid that this is just the beginning. Reykjavik has been praised, it has even been praised in the course of the U.S. election campaign. But the elections will be held 4 November. What will their tune be then? We can only wait and see.

Now let us turn back to the main issue. If there is no confirmation of the version that accord was not reached in the Icelandic capital because of partial, even technical differences, what is at the heart of the matter? My opinion: The present U.S. leadership proved to be unprepared for far-reaching accords on liquidating the threat of nuclear war. It may even be that it did not want such an accord at all.

Thinking matters over soberly, it is difficult to accept the actual formulation of the issue: Accord was not achieved **ONLY** because of SDI and **ONLY** on SDI [capitalized words printed in boldface]. After all, SDI -- no matter how much of a pipedream it may be -- is still not just a detail. It is a concentrated expression of a certain policy. A policy that is incompatible with nuclear disarmament and security.

SDI is primarily an attempt to ensure one's own security with the help of weapons and military technology. And this has never led to disarmament and peace -- only to arms race and war.

Further, SDI is an attempt to ensure security for one side only, while jeopardizing the other side's security. But unilateral security in our time is simply impossible. Our two powers can only survive or perish together.

Finally, SDI is nonetheless an attempt to find a way to wage and win a nuclear war, despite all the President's triumphant statements that he does not believe either to be possible.

Reykjavik shed light with utter clarity on all these contradictions in the current U.S. course and the discrepancy between the administration's words and actions. If, say, in 10 years all nuclear weapons will have been eliminated, why sacrifice this great cause for the sake of a weapons system for which there will not even be any targets -- ballistic missiles -- in 10 years' time?

President R. Reagan's explanations on this score were uncommonly unconvincing. He told M.S. Gorbachev something about a madman who might suddenly acquire several nuclear charges and blackmail the entire world. But could a "madman" really acquire nothing more nor less than an ICBM? Yet SDI is only of use against such missiles; it is powerless against cruise missiles or planes, let alone a saboteur with a nuclear bomb concealed in a suitcase.

In the United States the President was even more frank. There he spoke not of some anonymous "madman" but of the Russians. It is they -- "they should not be believed" -- who could allegedly conceal a number of weapons, and then things would be bad for the United States. He could not agree to leave the American people defenseless (that is, without SDI). What stupendous "logic"! -- first, it alleges that someone could conceal ICBMs (even given strict verification [kontrol] measures), second, how exactly could the U.S. President protect the American people against a nuclear attack? He could not, neither today nor in the foreseeable future. This was also pointed out to him by U.S. critics who noted that SDI would still be at the testing stage in 10 years' time. The only way to protect one's people against the nuclear threat is to destroy nuclear weapons, both your own and the other side's. [paragraph continues]

That is what the Soviet Union proposed in Reykjavik, but it was rejected by the U.S. President for the sake of the "Star Wars" chimera. And, third, if the President is so suspicious of the Russians and expects them to cheat whatever the verification [kontrol] methods, why, one wonders, did he go to Reykjavik and agree to arms reduction talks with the USSR? We will not even ask whether these suspicions are founded or not. Here is an eloquent fact: In one of his down-home tales to convince the American people of the need for SDI, he gave himself away. It turns out that he was not serious about negotiating and had absolutely no intention of reaching agreement.

Then the Reagan administration's position toward treaties -- on limiting strategic arms, on ABM defense, and others -- becomes clear. It has no time for them; it merely feels inhibited by them. The same is true of international organizations -- from the International Court and UNESCO to the United Nations. That is logical: If it gambles on force, weapons, and military hardware, international law becomes burdensome and there is only room left for the law of the fist.

So, the reader will ask, how come agreement was almost reached in Reykjavik? The fact is that each week there are more and more doubts about that "almost." How serious was the President himself? How advantageously could he have "sold" his positive decision? On returning home, how, in particular, could he have won the support of those who were already counting the billions that SDI and the arms race will cost and those who have already estimated how to warm their hands on international tension.

The other day eyewitnesses quoted to me the words of an anonymous ranking U.S. figure: "Thank God the President didn't sign anything in Reykjavik!" What if he had? Would not the current leaders of America then treat that agreement the same way they are planning to treat the SALT and ABM treaties?

U.S. DISTORTION OF REYKJAVIK RESULTS CONTINUES

Reagan Claims, SDI Factor

LD040910 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS -- By TASS analyst Vasiliy Kharkov:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in defending his destructive stand that thwarted a possible agreement in Reykjavik, continues to distort the outcome of the Soviet-American meeting.

TIME magazine has published the White House chief's explanation of what happened in Reykjavik. In accusing the Soviet side of inflexibility, Reagan said that if the USSR had agreed to the United States' having the "SDI shield", it would have been an easy job to sign the agreement on destroying all ballistic missiles.

The current Washington Administration is stubbornly clutching at SDI in the hope of gaining military superiority. This is precisely why Washington rejected the package of Soviet proposals leading to nuclear disarmament.

It is through the fault of the American side that the chance for adopting historic decisions towards a nuclear-free world was passed up in Reykjavik.

Many prominent political and public figures in the U.S. understand the situation and criticise the Administration for sacrificing the immense opportunities to the "Star Wars."

And in view of all that official Washington is accusing the Soviet side of being inflexible. Mikhail Gorbachev gave a clear appraisal of the Soviet stance in Reykjavik, explained why the American side preferred SDI to nuclear disarmament.

The chief danger of SDI, as the Soviet Union sees it, is the transfer of the arms race into a new sphere, the aspiration to place offensive weapons in space and thus gain military superiority.

Playing on the illusory hopes of some Americans, the SDI advocates are seeking to present it as a defensive anti-nuclear shield. In fact, SDI is an integral part of the first-strike doctrine.

Contradictory Accounts

PM311019 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed "Verbatim" report: "At Sixes and Sevens"]

[Text] UPI: As Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle, one of the participants in the talks at the Reykjavik summit, said on 27 October, Reagan "did not go along with" Soviet leader Gorbachev's proposal on eliminating all strategic nuclear armaments and "there was no discussion of the question of how to define strategic armaments."

"The President did not say this, but the Russians are trying to create the impression that he did," Perle said in an interview. "I think the Russians would have people believe that something was agreed on in Reykjavik which was not in fact agreed on."

THE NEW YORK TIMES: A senior White House official stated on 27 October that he "would not argue" with a Soviet claim that President Reagan accepted Gorbachev's proposal on banning all strategic offensive forces, and not just ballistic missiles, by 1996...

The aforementioned White House official, who supports the President and was talking on condition that his name would not be mentioned, for the first time indicated the possibility that Reagan had disregarded his advisers' concern about the dangers of agreeing to an all-embracing ban on all strategic offensive forces or long-range offensive forces.

The advisers warned that the ban should be limited to ballistic missiles so that the Soviet Union would be unable to exploit its superiority in conventional forces.

It was the latest and clearest of a number of admissions by the White House that the Soviet side is interpreting Reagan's words more or less correctly....

In addition to the pronouncements by the aforementioned White House official, other officials admit that the content of the talks corresponds by and large to the Soviet claim that President Reagan agreed, at least on a preliminary basis, that a general agreement on arms could incorporate a ban on all strategic offensive arms.

But officially the White House refused to comment on Reagan's words. It was still maintaining that in the sense of official proposals the United States only proposed a 50 percent reduction of strategic forces and the elimination of all types of offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a 10-year period.

The matter is complicated by the fact that Secretary of State Shultz, who joined Reagan in the final conversations with Gorbachev, provided evidence from the outset confirming the Soviet version.

In his first reports Shultz stated that the two sides were close to an agreement on banning all strategic weapons. He said this at the post-meeting press conference in Reykjavik and on 14 October at a White House briefing for members of Congress.

In connection with the broader possibility of ridding the world of all nuclear armaments, including medium-range, close-range, and battlefield weapons, according to the Soviet version, Reagan said: "If we agree to eliminate all nuclear armaments by the end of a 10-year period, we can communicate this accord to our delegations in Geneva for them to prepare a treaty which you would be able to sign during your visit to the United States."

Without disputing this quotation, the aforementioned White House official said that "nothing came" of this.

U.S., W. EUROPE DEVIATE FROM REYKJAVIK STANCES

PM031349 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 86 Morning Edition pp 45

[Stanislav Kondrashov commentary: "Clarifying Reykjavik"]

[Text] It is difficult to discuss Reykjavik because so much has already been said on the subject. But it must be discussed because there is no event more important -- and it continues to develop, become clearer, and have effect.

For 2 days two men talked together in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy on the shore of a cold and remote bay. And immediately after their meeting -- the most detailed reports, no secrets, nothing behind the scenes. This is the world of today, with its electronic speed and complex sensation of unity born of the desire to overcome contradictions that are lethally dangerous to everyone. This is the nature of present summit meetings: They at least give those taking part the opportunity to define their positions before the whole of an avidly attentive mankind.

The leaders of the two great powers have no cause to complain of insufficient attention. But when they meet, attention is not merely doubled -- it increases tenfold. To an even greater extent than Geneva, Reykjavik was a mouthpiece, an amplifier, a megaphone. And it is with this, in my opinion, that its significance begins for the world public, which wants to know the policies of Moscow and Washington and draw its own conclusions.

Reykjavik gave the Soviet leader the opportunity to expound our position on the most important arms control issues before an unprecedentedly wide audience and at a dramatic moment of the summit.

It is well known that the Soviet program, the Soviet stage-by-stage route to a nuclear-free world, was made public in M.S. Gorbachev's statement on 15 January this year. [paragraph continues]

To a large extent the Reykjavik package is based on that statement. But in some areas, medium-range nuclear weapons in particular, the Soviet Union went further to meet the position of the United States and the European nuclear powers -- Britain and France -- and made major concessions.

The response to the Soviet package set out at the negotiating table before the American President and then -- immediately after -- before the whole world has been unprecedentedly broad. Thanks to Reykjavik's unique amplifying effect, our willingness for nuclear disarmament has become even more convincing and has been conveyed to a very large number of people in America, Europe, Asia, everywhere. This would appear to be a benefit from the meeting in Iceland -- a benefit already fully apparent. Although only the future can fully determine the political potential and political result of Reykjavik, the world now has a clearer idea of the Soviet position, the American position, and the historic opportunity to reach agreement which has now been missed -- owing to the U.S. President's devotion to his "Strategic Defense Initiative."

There is more. With the speed characteristic of the nuclear missile-electronic age, the package of Soviet proposals was transmitted from Iceland to the political tables of all interested capitals. The struggle surrounding the legacy left by the summit meeting and interpretation of that legacy began immediately. To all appearances, this struggle will be prolonged and intense. It must not be forgotten that it is not the public, whose eyes have been opened to the Soviet proposals, but official circles that have the final say in the political practice of any Western state, at the moment at least. And these official circles, like the unofficial political circles which share their opinions, have long mastered the art of closing even the most wide-open eyes -- through various clarifications and explanations distorting what really happened.

Standing up close, the whole face can't be seen.... M.S. Gorbachev quoted this apt line from Yessenin at a press conference in Reykjavik, explaining to journalists that immediately after the meeting he could only communicate his first impressions and first analysis. And then, imagine, the American President now claims that the Soviet leader failed to grasp his position although in fact it is he -- the American President -- who is deviating from his own Reykjavik position.

What is really happening? Face to face with the Soviet leader, the U.S. President declared his willingness to eliminate all strategic nuclear arms in the course of the next 10 years. Now, back in Washington again, his advisers say that the President was misunderstood and that he only envisaged the complete elimination of ballistic missiles. This is less advantageous to the Soviet Union than America, which would thereby retain its superiority in strategic bombers and cruise missiles.

As is well known, authoritative representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry have refuted the President's advisers by citing actual quotes from the President -- from the transcript of the talks in Reykjavik between the two leaders. Unfortunately, words are easier to refute than facts -- facts which show that, given the present correlation of forces in U.S. ruling circles, today's American Administration is highly skeptical of the prospect of a nonnuclear future. Either on earth, where it intends to retain (and increase) nuclear weapons, or in space, where it would like to deploy these weapons in one way or another. The post-Reykjavik debates across the ocean make this clear.

And the reaction in Western Europe has revealed something else. Bonn, London, and Paris have ceased to support Ronald Reagan's "zero option," which envisaged the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. This has not happened out of opposition to Washington but since the Soviet Union agreed to this option in Reykjavik -- laying aside, incidentally, its own quite valid objections to the British and French missiles. Since the Soviet concession in Reykjavik the U.S. West European allies have hastily restructured their arguments in order to...reject this concession. Now they are insisting that nuclear disarmament in the European theater would be dangerous for them because it would supposedly weaken the American nuclear shield and increase Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. It turns out that they prefer a Europe filled with nuclear weapons and are even prepared to reconcile themselves to the Soviet missiles as long as the American ones remain, as long as Europe does not become nonnuclear.

This kind of political and propaganda about-face in West European capitals forces one to stop and think how serious they are in looking for ways to reduce tension. Well, here, too, the picture is becoming clearer and more real.

Let us return to the American President, however. On his return from Reykjavik he immediately went on a lightning tour of his country's cities and rural areas, immersing himself in the fever of the last days before the congressional elections and agitating for the Republican candidates for the Senate and the House of Representatives. In this respect he did the real American thing and sold Reykjavik, persuading people that it is only thanks to the positions of strength he has created that American-Soviet dialogue is maintained and that his loyalty to SDI is the main incentive -- for Moscow -- to continue this dialogue.

This is the leitmotiv which runs through his speeches: "No responsible President can count on the Russians' promises when it comes to guaranteeing the security of his country.... We can either count on American technology or on the promises made by the Soviet Union -- both have their own reputation -- and I am ready to count on American technology every time."

These revelations to ordinary domestic audiences not only display the usual oath of loyalty to SDI -- the President's favorite offspring -- and not only the typically American preference for technological solutions over political ones. They also show a rejection of the concept of mutual security -- a rejection which is dangerous to the cause of peace. Because no "Soviet promises" to America can exist outside jointly elaborated American-Soviet accords which coordinate the balance of interests. The long-standing imperial complex of American exclusivity and the old arrogant way of thinking, which dictates the need to safeguard America's security in isolation and, what is more, to the detriment of others, made themselves felt in Reykjavik. And they continue to do so. Which proves what difficult tasks we have still to resolve -- persistently and consistently -- in our relations with the United States.

READERS TOLD WHY SDI CONCESSION 'IMPOSSIBLE'

PM031637 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Mikhail Ozerov article under the rubric "Opinions and Doubts": "On 'Superlove' of SDI"]

[Text] "I listened with tremendous attention to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statements after Reykjavik and read them in the newspaper, but one point is not clear to me. [paragraph continues]

"Reagan said several years ago that he would not take a single step back from his beloved SDI. Since we made so many compromises in Iceland, perhaps it was worth making one more and not focusing attention on the 'Star Wars' program?"

This question was put to me when I was speaking about my trip to Reykjavik at the Cinematographers' Union. And it at once occurred to me: Some readers of our newspaper ask about the same thing. I will cite just one statement -- by Mariya Olegovna Stefashina, a doctor from Kirov -- which, it is true, is most categorical: "Shouldn't we have just backed down on the issue of SDI? For if documents had been signed in Iceland on some things at least, the situation would have improved, and not vice versa."

Questions associated with SDI rained down on us Soviet journalists literally like a squall even back in Reykjavik. After Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's press conference, which, as everyone remembers, ended late in the evening, the Icelandic capital had no thought of sleep. All four press centers were particularly busy: Soviet, American, Icelandic, and international. Heated debates and arguments were developing everywhere, and a great many of them were linked in one way or another with the American "Strategic Defence Initiative" -- SDI.

At that time we explained the Soviet position in detail. Today, after new statements by our party leader, it has become still clearer.

No, Mariya Olegovna, in Reykjavik it was impossible to reach agreement "on some things" without touching on SDI. And this is why. You have undoubtedly noticed how frequently the word "package" features in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's recent statements. This is no coincidence. We have proposed not arms. And a package is a balance of interests, mutual concessions, and compromises which are very closely linked with each other and constitute a practically unified whole. Judge for yourselves: Is it really possible to open and close a door simultaneously? In just the same way you cannot limit the arms race and, at the same time, create [sozdavat] new, fundamentally new types of weapons. Remember M.S. Gorbachev's words, which we heard on television on 22 October: "With knowledge of the problem, I can now say just one thing: The continuation of the SDI program will drag the world into a new stage of the arms race and destabilize the strategic situation."

This, incidentally, is the answer to you regarding the international situation. Would it really improve if, having eliminated nuclear weapons, the world acquired in return a threat from space?

Now about another aspect. Indeed, back in early 1983, when the American "Star Wars" program was announced, Ronald Reagan began beating his breast: he would never abandon it, he said. But does that mean that we should accept his idea? We take the directly opposite approach to what space should be like. So why should we sit with arms folded and wait for the sky to become an arena for deadly nuclear skirmishes?

We have never acted in that way. Nor do we intend to do so. This was why the Soviet side raised this problem in Reykjavik and did so firmly and decisively.

Nor will I conceal another fact. We had hoped that the shoots of realism and the new thinking, which are now absolutely essential, would at last begin to sprout on American soil. Surely reason cannot sleep forever in the White House, can it?

Our hopes of securing major agreements in Iceland were also founded on the fact that the Soviet Union was ready to make very great concessions. It was ready to make them and did so.

But these, as we know, did not follow. Nor did realism make its presence felt either. It was precisely the President's reluctance to abandon his chief gamble on "Star Wars" that prevented our countries from making great progress on a wide range of nuclear disarmament issues.

It is not a matter here of Reagan's "superlove" of SDI. Nor of the fact that he considers it a "panacea against war," an "insurance policy for America," and so forth. The Western press is now full of statements of this type, and all kinds of radio voices are vigorously trying to impose them on their listeners.

There are also more than enough quotations debunking these myths, and our readers undoubtedly know of them. Therefore I will cite just one -- from the American newspaper NEWSDAY: "If Moscow removes its missiles, and Reagan also apparently advocates this, why is SDI needed?"

Why? The answer is clear. True disarmament is like a thorn in the side of the President, his entourage, and the omnipotent military monopolists. They have pursued and are continuing to pursue a line of militant anticommunism. Of course, this is a sad conclusion, but it is the one you draw on observing and analyzing the Americans' position in Reykjavik and also at the present time.

Now the last point. To rid the world of fear of the future, we must not arm together but disarm together. Only in this way, and certainly not with the help of the notorious SDI, can genuine security be achieved. Therefore there can be just one answer to the question "Shouldn't we back down?": No way.

PRIMAKOV ANALYZES U.S. INSISTENCE ON SDI

LD032220 Moscow Television in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, by unidentified interviewer; time and place not given -- recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified interviewer] Mid-term elections are to be held in the United States tomorrow. President Reagan took an active part in the election campaign and has made the question of the so-called SDI into one of the main questions of foreign policy. Well, what arguments did he use in this?

[Primakov] Well, two usual arguments that he had already used prior to the election campaign and during its course. First the SDI, it is alleged, is capable of reliable defense of the United States and its allies. Second, it is alleged that in Reykjavik his role was that of a peacemaker; he was also firm and he would even have none of the deep cuts proposed by the USSR in the package involving action against the SDI. Here, then are his two arguments.

However, they absolutely fail to correspond to reality. Let us begin by saying that scientists and experts from numerous countries are of the view that a reliable defense against nuclear arms, against nuclear missiles, cannot be created in the shape of the SDI. A defense of this kind cannot be created. It is technically not feasible. Many, including -- well, I have recently been in Japan, attending a symposium organized by the paper MAINICHU and McNamara, the former U.S. defense secretary took part in this symposium -- well, he called this idea an unrealizable and strange dream.

[Interviewer] Then why is it that we are so active against this idea?

[Primakov] Well, this is a good question. We are so active against this idea because, in practice, it blocks nuclear disarmament, because it blocks arms reductions. I would like to ask our esteemed television viewers to return to Reykjavik. There, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put the question in the following way: Please, nurse your SDI, go ahead with research and tests even -- but do not put them into space, do not take it out into space.

After all, it should be understood that the very fact of it being put into space brings up where to begin with, you will draw the line between tests in space and the deployment of nuclear arms in space. What wall can there be between these two positions, between these two processes? This means that we are exposed, since the Americans can put the arms out and site them on platforms; moreover, these are offensive weapons. Furthermore, this was linked by us -- I am talking of the possibility of such research outside of space and of tests outside of space within the SDI framework -- we linked these directly with the fact that the United States and we would, for a period of 10 years, not go beyond the ABM Treaty, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty which, as is known, was signed in 1972 and which is the basis for any arms reductions we have implemented.

Does it follow from this that we fear the SDI? Of course not. However, we can see only too well where the United States is taking these matters under the guise of the SDI. And they are going about it in such a way as to, first, create new types and new systems of nuclear arms on which they are working, because work on the SDI is not just work on some unrealizable and strange dream. It is, you understand, work that makes it possible to attain breakthroughs in various areas, moreover breakthroughs in the form of tangible results of one kind or another to do with qualitative improvements of various types of arms. Second -- and this worries us a lot and it is natural that we should be worried -- under the guise of the SDI work, the United States is altogether doing away with the ABM Treaty which is very important, I would say extraordinarily important, since it prevents the possibility of, on the one hand, the arms race, an unrestrained arms race and, on the other hand, it creates conditions for arms reductions. That is why we are against the SDI.

President Reagan has turned the SDI into a sacred cow which, he says, must not be touched. But I wish to say that we harbor no intentions of butchering this sacred cow, we are confident it will die of its own accord.

Then who needs this sacred cow? It is needed by business, it is needed by business. Moreover, it is needed by business that is not only and not so much interested in creating some kind of SDI which will be the ideal defensive weapon; but business that is interested in the arms race both within the framework of the SDI and, so to speak, without this framework, business that is against arms reductions, since these take away its profits.

I have in mind here the military and industrial sector of U.S. business. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that it plays a big part, although one should not overestimate the importance of this sector in all business.

That is why real opportunities are being created for the U.S. business and for the U.S. politicians generally to rethink their positions, if they approach what is taking place in the world with a genuine sense of responsibility.

[Interviewer] Thank you very much.

[Primakov] Not at all.

U.S. 'VIOLATION' OF MONITORING ACCORD ASSESSED

LD301430 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] The U.S. State Department has limited to 1 week the visit of the Soviet scientists who are due to come to the United States in order to determine the site for the installation of seismographic equipment to monitor [kontrol] nuclear tests. The American scientists who have been installing similar equipment in the USSR have described the State Department's decision as discriminatory. Here is a "Mayak" commentary: At the microphone is political observer Nikolay Shishlin.

On the whole, this is a rather amusing story. For many long years the United States has been speculating about the Soviet Union's approach to the question of monitoring [kontrol]. They have been claiming that the Soviet Union has far too morbid an attitude to this problem, and is evading monitoring [kontrol], preferring to talk just about practical steps connected with limiting the arms race.

But here we have the Soviet Union calling for each practical step toward limiting and curtailing the arms race being accompanied by proper and very strict and binding measures for monitoring [kontrol] the curtailment of the arms race. And it finds that the United States was indeed speculating when it spoke about its desire to establish strict monitoring [kontrol] over measures to restrict and curtail the arms race.

This story about the siting of the American seismographs close to our nuclear testing ground at Semipalatinsk, and the United States' violation of the accord about the siting of corresponding apparatus close to the Nevada Desert where the American nuclear tests are being carried out, gives a clear indication of who favors monitoring [kontrol] and who is against it. But this is not the only issue. It is not just a matter of who is for monitoring [kontrol] and who is against it. This, in point of fact, shows who favors limiting and curtailing the arms race and who is against limiting the arms race. This shows who favors improving the international climate and who favors maintaining international tension and of raising the level of confrontation.

I believe, nevertheless, that such self-exposure helps matters. The more so since now this very problem -- the liquidation of the nuclear arms race -- is not just a Soviet-American matter, it belongs to the whole world community. And that community believes that the Americans cannot keep giving their wretched "no" to every such proposal when the world community, and the Soviet Union, calls for a sharp turn for the better.

That is why it seems to me that this latest story connected with the violation of the agreement between the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences and the well-known Society for Environmental Protection in the United States serves, of course, as an additional argument both for the public and for political circles in the United States that American foreign policy is not only vulnerable to criticism, but that American foreign policy is in need of alternations, and radical ones at that.

U.S. GENEVA INSTRUCTIONS TWIST ICELAND ACCORDS

Military-Industrial Alarm

PM311623 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev article under the rubric "TASS Commentary for KRSNAYA ZVEZDA": "Washington: Backtracking from Reykjavik"]

[Text] According to L. Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, the U.S. Administration has sent instructions to the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. "We are ready to embark on serious negotiations based on what was achieved in Reykjavik... We consider it possible to achieve progress proceeding from the foundation that was laid in Iceland," Speakes declared.

Outwardly these statements seem serious enough. They could be viewed with optimism if, first, the instructions to the U.S. delegation were really based on the foundation laid in Reykjavik, and, second, if the U.S. negotiators had been instructed to seek realistic ways out of the impasses into which the U.S. SDI has put the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

However, unfortunately, this is by no means the case. For one thing, the U.S. delegation at the talks has been instructed to push through a distorted rather than the true version of the accord on nuclear arms reached in Iceland. According to AP they want to discuss the dismantling by 1996 of only the Soviet and U.S. ballistic missiles and not all strategic offensive arms as agreed in Iceland. Washington officialdom has no intention of totally scrapping the bombers and air-launched cruise missiles in which it has an outright advantage.

Now it has become clear why all hell was let loose in Washington around the results achieved in Reykjavik, why all kind of "clarifications" and "explanations" were necessary claiming that the president was "misunderstood," that what he meant was "something quite different," and so forth. Forces that fear an end to the arms race more than the devil have gone into action. Their aim is to create as many obstacles as possible on the path of progress and to emasculate the process initiated at the Soviet-American summit.

In actual fact the U.S. President agreed in Reykjavik with the reasoning of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in favor of finding a radical solution to the problem of strategic arms which would not sidestep the elimination of other dangerous types of nuclear arms -- in addition to ballistic missiles, that is. Neither did R. Reagan object to a broader approach, letting it be known that he was not opposed to the elimination of all nuclear explosive devices by the end of two 5-year periods. [paragraph continues]

Furthermore, the President expressed the idea that if there was agreement "to eliminate all nuclear arms by the end of a 10-year period," this accord could be passed on to the delegations in Geneva. It was the U.S. side's consent to this radical solution of the problem of nuclear arms that made it possible to reach a mutually acceptable accord on strategic offensive arms in Reykjavik.

That the sides were close to concluding an agreement banning all strategic weapons was confirmed by Secretary of State G. Shultz at a press conference in Reykjavik at the close of the meeting and subsequently at a briefing for congressmen in the White House 14 October. Senator S. Nunn, who attended the Shultz briefing and a subsequent meeting with President R. Reagan, has said: "In response to my question whether the President had really agreed to M.S. Gorbachev's proposal 'to destroy all strategic offensive arms by 1996,' the President answered affirmatively by nodding his head." According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. officials admit the President "agreed, at least in a preliminary manner, that an overall agreement could include a ban on all strategic offensive arms." In his 16 October speech the head of the White House himself said outright: "Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come closer to finding the magic formula that would permit us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our respective arsenals and even to eliminate them altogether."

Not for nothing did all this greatly alarm the representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex. So, for instance, Z. Brzezinski, the well-known advocate of anti-Sovietism, has just written in an article published in the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT: "The Soviets...dragged the President into a discussion about a 'nuclear-free' future ... When the Soviets unexpectedly submitted their specific arms control proposals to the President, he should have said that he would study them carefully... In that way the Soviet proposals would have been parried and the concessions would have stayed in our pocket. Instead, the United States went and swallowed the bait..."

And so Washington officialdom is now trying to dissociate itself from what took place in Reykjavik, it is referring to what were essentially intermediate positions while the talks were going on. "Correcting" the president's stance after the event, they are trying to secure superiority for the United States. If the ballistic missiles were dismantled by both sides, F. Ikle, under secretary of defense, has said, the United States "would be in a slightly better position" compared with the USSR, and the strategic balance would revert to what it was in the early sixties. A "numerical background" was provided by specialists from the Rand Corporation who worked out that the United States has a 3:1 advantage in cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

As for Mr. Speakes' statement about the "possibility of achieving progress" at the Geneva talks, it is designed to deliberately mislead both the American and the world public. As distinct from Speakes, spokesmen for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves with utmost frankness on the subject then they said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "decided not to object" to the U.S. proposals on nuclear arms because the Soviet Union would "turn them down" anyway. "If these proposals are to be rejected, let it happen in Geneva" -- this, according to the CBS network, is the opinion of the Pentagon military leadership. This clearly confirms that what the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks is being fed is not what was mutually acceptable to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President in Reykjavik but rather what "suits" the U.S. military-industrial complex.

And as for tightening the ABM Treaty, numerous statements made after Reykjavik by ranking representatives of the U.S. Administration including the President indicate that Washington officialdom continues to cling to its obstructionist stance, insisting that all the work planned under the SDI program will be carried out which means that it intends to continue to work toward destroying the treaty. Does this testify to readiness "to embark on serious negotiations" -- to use Speakes' words?

Another quite legitimate question also arises: Are the authors of the "instructions" to the U.S. delegation in Geneva not simply trying to thwart the talks that are meant to find a positive conclusion to what was begun in Reykjavik, to identify the potential for eliminating the obstacles which came to light in Reykjavik, and the elaborate mutually acceptable agreements?

Return to Limits, Sublimits

LD040433 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Igor Pavlov commentary]

[Text] In Geneva the American side has gone back to limits and sublimits in strategic offensive weapons reductions instead of building on the breakthrough which was reported to have been achieved in Reykjavik earlier this month. Here is comment by Igor Pavlov of our staff.

Speaking at a news conference on October 12th in Reykjavik and in his subsequent appearances on Soviet television, Mikhail Gorbachev has taken a shot at the American position which sought to confuse the crux of the matter with all those limits and sublimits, in short, with a lot of arithmetic. The Soviet proposal deals with a 50 percent across the board on all such weapons in 5 years. In other words, by the end of this 5-year period both sides could have the same mix of weapons they have not, but only reduced in size by half. By contrast it takes a wizard to grasp the technical side of the American offer. True, each negotiator in Geneva, Soviet and American, can rely on a pocket calculator to add and subtract, multiply and divide.

But why seek to complicate matters with an avalanche of figures? Here's an example of some of the numbers mentioned in the United States proposals. Of the 6,000 warheads and air-launched cruise missiles for each side, no more than 4,800 can be warheads on ballistic missiles. Of the 4,800 warheads no more than 3,300 can be on landbased missiles. Of these 3,300 warheads, no more than 1,650 warheads can be on heavy missiles. You see my point? There are more numbers, figures, limits, and sublimits to be sure. So if you wish, we could go on with them for another 5 minutes.

Now back to our question. Why seek to complicate the delicate business of arms reduction with all this? Judging by some initial reactions in the United States itself, the new American plan continues to impose these limits and sub-limits with a view to restructuring the Soviet Union's force of landbased missiles; the mainstay of its nuclear arsenals. Just because the White House dislikes some Soviet weapons -- as if this country is supposed to like everything there is in the American arsenal -- it seeks to dictate to us what sort of intercontinental ballistic missiles this country may have. The outcome of the Reykjavik summit continues to be revised in Washington.

U.S. POSITION ON N-TESTS VIEWED AS TALKS RESUME

LD021556 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 2 Nov 86

[Text] Oleg Blinov, an international affairs journalist, is at the microphone.

[Blinov] The Soviet-American talks on the problem of halting nuclear arms tests resume today in Geneva. Our commentator Viktor Levin is now next to me in the studio, and I am asking him to tell us what these talks will deal with.

[Levin] These talks will discuss a whole range of questions related to monitoring and determining ways to give up nuclear tests completely.

[Blinov] If my memory serves me, is it not the third round of these talks?

[Levin] Yes, quite right. The first round took place from 25 July to 1 August; the second one was from 4 to 18 September.

[Blinov] And what are the results of the first two rounds?

[Levin] One must say that in both rounds one sentence has been repeated verbatim: Wide discussions were held and a detailed exchange of opinions took place. This means that the first two rounds of the talks have produced no concrete results.

[Blinov] Why is this?

[Levin] I think that, first, the United States does not wish to solve the main problem of stopping nuclear tests. It is known that the Soviet Union has been adhering to a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for more than a year. We have outlined our position several times and extended this moratorium four times; and now, as you know, it will be in force until the end of this year. The door for the United States to join our moratorium remains open, but as you know, in Washington the present administration refuses categorically to follow our example. And yet, a moratorium is the most radical way of halting nuclear tests by the two great powers. This would open the way for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on halting nuclear explosion.

We consider -- and, by the way, this position was outlined by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the meeting in Reykjavik with President Reagan -- that even if the Americans are not prepared to follow the Soviet Union's example on the moratorium, it may be possible to come to an interim agreement on explosion quotas.

However, we must definitely, jointly pursue the common goal of concluding a treaty on halting nuclear tests. The United States has been, until recently, paying special attention to the problem of monitoring, and they were alleging that everything depends on this question. Such a question does not exist. The Soviet Union believes that any monitoring is acceptable. Furthermore, not only have we declared our readiness for any form of monitoring, but we confirm this by our practical actions.

[Blinov] Are you referring to the fact that American seismographs have been located for a very long time in the region of Soviet nuclear tests, in the area of Semipalatinsk, where the nuclear test ground is completely silent; and that in response we have agreed with American specialists that similar Soviet seismographs be set up by our scientists not far from the nuclear test site in the United States, in the state of Nevada.

[Levin] Well, the U.S. State Department dragged its feet for a long time on granting visas to Soviet scientists; it eventually granted them, but gave them only a 1-week entry visa and restricted their options for choosing the most convenient locations and setting up their equipment. This very clearly and convincingly shows that the United States has, until recently, been disguising its unwillingness to follow the Soviet Union's call to move toward concluding a treaty on completely halting nuclear tests behind the mask of talks about monitoring. Now when this trump -- and let us speak frankly, false trump -- has been forced from the hands of the United States, I have no doubt that they will try to find another new pretext, since the U.S. Administration is not prepared to halt nuclear explosions. And this is fact.

[Blinov] Moreover, it is obvious that the persistent unwillingness of the American side to look for common ground on halting nuclear tests is accounted for by its desire to establish, as soon as possible, its so-called nuclear umbrella. It is SDI itself that became an obstacle at the summit meeting in Iceland to a comprehensive agreement. But today the understanding that Washington's planned program for a space shield obstructs the current process of disarmament is growing throughout the world.

The slogans, too, with which the participants in antiwar demonstrations, held during the week of action on disarmament, went into the streets in various countries attest to this. It ended on 31 October. The week has demonstrated peoples' aspirations for peace and for a halt to the arms race. Let me just mention several actions:

In Denmark a lesson of peace was conducted in most schools after which tens of thousands of multicolored balloons were released into the sky. Austrian peace fighters collected more than 25,000 signatures under an appeal requesting the immediate halting of nuclear tests. Demonstrations, torch-lit processions, meetings in support of demands for a nuclear weapons ban, and prevention of space militarization took place in India, Spain, Norway, Italy, Belgium, and many other countries. In the United States itself, antiwar processions took place under the slogan of: Jobs, not bombs.

Most members of the U.S. National Academy of Science spoke out against the Star Wars program. This has become clear from a poll conducted among 450 American scientists. Their British colleagues have shown solidarity with them. As has been reported from London, about 550 British scientific specialists have signed a petition against participation in research work on the Star Wars program. All this shows that it is specialists and scientists themselves -- people who are least subjected to the propaganda noise of Washington and who rely on their own analysis of the Star Wars program -- who are starting to reflect more and more that SDI will not ensure American security at all but will lead to a complete destabilization of the strategic situation and will involve the world in a new stage of the arms race, a stage that will have upredictably tragic consequences.

UN FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATES DISARMAMENT ISSUES

USSR, PRC Oppose Space Arms

LD300133 Moscow TASS in English 0013 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshov reports:

Delegates of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly view prevention of the militarisation in space as the task of historic importance. The debate in the committee on concrete items of the agenda pertaining to disarmament have been keynoted by the thought that the "Star Wars" programme should not be allowed to dash the hopes of humanity for a world without nuclear arms.

The Reykjavik meeting posed acutely again the question why SDI is the symbol of the obstruction of the entire process of nuclear disarmament, director of the Institute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Roald Sagdeyev said on Wednesday. The historic lesson of the meeting shows that there is a real hope for a political road of averting nuclear menace, the road of complete elimination of nuclear arms. In the light of this meeting it becomes particularly clear that the large-scale SDI programme should become pointless, even to its supporters.

The Soviet representative debunked all attempts to present SDI as a "defensive" programme, called the attention of the international community to dangerous military-strategic consequences which the change of the existing strategic doctrine based on nuclear balance will inevitably entail.

There is a peaceful alternative to a spread of the arms race to space: exploration and uses of space in the interests of entire humanity, he said. American science, American technology achieved outstanding successes in this sphere. One would like to hope that American strategic thinking will match the genius of the American people in technology.

China tabled on Wednesday to the First Committee the draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution expresses the confidence that the development of space arms systems entails a qualitative escalation of the arms race which is dangerous as it is, aggravates the situation in the world still more. The PRC urges all states, particularly those having large space potential, to promote vigorously the achievement of the aim of peaceful uses of outer space, to take sooner effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in space.

Israelyan Urges N-Test Ban

LD312235 Moscow TASS in English 2114 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 31 TASS -- The Soviet Union has always strongly advocated and continues to advocate a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the opening of full-scale talks on the issue, said USSR representative, Viktor Israelyan, speaking today in the First Committee of the 41st session of the UN General Assembly. In Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to the message from the leaders of the six countries it was stated that.

"At present, there is no task more immediate and important than ending all nuclear testing. We associate this step with the beginning of movement down the road leading to a nuclear-free world".

The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests is an important self-contained disarmament measure. We believe that the nuclear states could address this issue already now, without waiting for the outcome of the talks that are under way on other aspects of the arms race, Soviet delegate declared. The particular urgency of the problem of banning nuclear testing is also due to the fact that as a result of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, declared by the Soviet Union from August 6, 1985, there has emerged an entirely new situation favorable to an early solution of this problem.

If the Soviet moratorium were to be joined by the United States, a serious and responsible and stockpiling of the most destructive weapons. To miss the opportunity that has opened up would not be simply a manifestation of indifference for the future of mankind but a criminal act, Viktor Israelyan added.

A declaration of a moratorium by all the nuclear powers -- to be followed up with a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests -- would have just about the same significance for making further progress. In a situation of world-wide silence at all the nuclear test sites, it would be possible to concentrate the efforts on charting the shortest possible routes on the map of roads leading to a safe world, a world without nuclear weapons.

In introducing its proposals for banning nuclear tests, the Soviet Union stated that it was interested in enforcing a most stringent verification of such a ban, including international verification. The Soviet Government's consent to the installation of American monitoring equipment in the area of Semipalatinsk clearly proves it. The USSR has more than once expressed its readiness to use the offer by the six countries of "five continents" to provide assistance in verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection, if the other side, too, accepts the offer. The Soviet Union has also expressed its positive view of the proposal to organize a meeting of experts of the said six countries together with Soviet and American specialists in order to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, Soviet representative stressed.

All this attests to the fact that there is no problem with the Soviet Union as regards the verification of a ban on nuclear test. In essence, we agree with any forms of verification. The United States' position is blocking concrete negotiations on this problem, which has long been ripe for solution, Viktor Israelyan stated.

It becomes increasingly clear that Washington is motivated by the desire to retain for the United States the possibility of qualitatively upgrading old types of nuclear weapons and developing new ones and thus carrying on the nuclear arms race. The true reason for the U.S. Administration's reluctance to renounce nuclear explosions is the desire to upset the existing balance of forces to their own advantage.

A weighty contribution can and must be made by the United Nations to achieve progress toward the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear test. The U.N. efforts in this major area should be redoubled and made more dynamic and purposeful.

Resolution on New Weapons

LD040043 Moscow TASS in English 2306 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 3 TASS -- A large group of socialist and nonaligned countries, among them the Soviet Union, has submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly for consideration.

The draft resolution bans the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

It calls on all countries to utilise scientific and technological achievements only for peaceful purposes and to take effective measures to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and, if they do emerge, to begin talks on banning them.

U.S. PRESSURES NATO GROUP FOR SDI STANCE SUPPORT

PM240747 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Pressure on the Allies"]

[Text] London, 22 Oct -- The United States has resorted to its favorite tactic of putting pressure on its allies with the aim of forcing them to unconditionally support its unconstructive stand which led to the breakdown of accords in the arms control sphere at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

According to press reports, at the scheduled session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at present taking place behind closed doors in Gleneagles (Scotland), Caspar Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary, has channeled his "main efforts" into this. THE GUARDIAN notes that the Pentagon chief has tried, in particular, to secure the support of Washington's NATO partners for the American position regarding the "Star Wars" program, which is the chief obstacle in the way of reaching agreements on arms control. C. Weinberger, the newspaper reports, has insisted that work on this program must not be limited to laboratory research.

A number of West European members of the North Atlantic bloc do not agree with this, however. PA notes that Norway, Denmark, and Greece "expressed indignation" over the fact that the Reagan "Star Wars" program was an obstacle in the way of reaching major agreements in Reykjavik.

The stand taken by Washington's main West European ally, -- Britain, -- at the session was distinguished by its duality. On the one hand, as THE GUARDIAN observes, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shows "far less enthusiasm than President Reagan" for the "Star Wars" program and speaks in favor of strict observance of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty provisions. At a press conference at the end of the first day of the session's work, George Younger, British secretary of state for defense, said that the British Government would like the unconditional elimination of all medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. On the other hand, the same G. Younger stressed that nuclear weapons must remain "a vitally important component" of the West's military strategy in the foreseeable future.

It is clear that the session in Gleneagles is characterized not only by Washington's pressure on its partners but also by an atmosphere of discord. Attempts by NATO defense ministers to demonstrate a "spirit of solidarity," as THE TIMES observes, are intended only "for the public."

REPORTAGE OF CEMA SESSION, RYZHKOV ACTIVITIES

Ryzhkov Meets Ceausescu

LDO40001 Moscow TASS in English 2259 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Bucharest November 3 TASS -- A meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, took place here today.

Nikolay Ryzhkov is heading a Soviet delegation attending the current 42nd meeting of the CMEA session in Bucharest.

There was an exchange of views on matters of Soviet-Romanian cooperation as well as on the present-day international situation.

Special attention was given to the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik at which, due to the constructive stand of the Soviet side, a possibility of accord was opening up on such major issues as reduction and then complete elimination of strategic offensive arms, and the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Nicolae Ceausescu highly appreciated the large-scale proposals which were put forward in Reykjavik by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and which are illustrative of a new approach to nuclear disarmament, and pointed out the need for the same kind of approach on the part of the United States.

It was emphasized that it was essential to utilize more effectively the USSR's and Romania's scientific and technological potential both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the comprehensive program for the scientific and technological progress of CMEA member countries in the period ending in the year 2000. The program is meant to solve major matters pertaining to the development of the productive forces of the entire socialist community.

Both sides expressed a desire to deepen Soviet-Romanian contacts in all fields, to enrich their content, and to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship between the Soviet and Romanian peoples.

During the discussion of the present-day situation in the world, it was pointed out that it was of special importance to further deepen cooperation between the Warsaw Treaty Member States and all socialist countries in the struggle to remove the threat of nuclear war and to ensure security and peaceful future of the peoples.

The two sides expressed the USSR's and Romania's determination to cooperate still more closely in solving the basic problems of our times and in strengthening the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community and their cooperation in international affairs in accordance with the agreed-upon line worked out at the Budapest Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States.

The meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu and Nikolay Ryzhkov was held in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere.

TASS on Session Opening

LD031605 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Bucharest November 4 TASS -- The 42nd meeting of the session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) opened in Bucharest today. The meeting will be discussing the course of the implementation of scopeful tasks set out by the economic summit of the CMEA countries in Moscow. The Soviet delegation headed by member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov take part in the meeting.

Participants Listed

LD032352 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Special correspondents for TASS report from Bucharest: The fraternal countries of the socialist community are successfully tackling the large-scale tasks which were outlined by the economic conference of the CEMA member countries which was held at summit level in Moscow. Since then a major stride has been taken in economic development. The standard of living of the peoples of these countries has improved. The congresses of communist and workers' parties which have been held in the CEMA member countries have elaborated the strategic course for the acceleration of socioeconomic development and confirmed the aspiration for more active cooperation in order to intensify production and further deepen socialist economic integration.

Ways of effectively tackling the tasks facing the countries of the community are being discussed at the 42d meeting of the CEMA which opened today in the capital of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Delegations from the CEMA member countries are taking part in the work of the session. The heads of these delegations are:

Atanasov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers;

Lazar, chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers;

Vo Chi Cong, first deputy chairman of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers;

Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers;

Rodriguez, vice president of the Council of State and vice president of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba;

Sodnom, chairman of the Mongolian Council of Ministers;

Messner, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers;

Dascalescu, prime minister of the Romanian Government;

Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers;

Strougal, chairman of the CSSR Government.

Under the agreement between the CEMA and the SFRY Government a Yugoslav delegation, headed by Zemljarić, vice president of the Federal Executive Council, is taking part in the work of the session. Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the PDRY, the Laotian People's Democratic Republic, Socialist Ethiopia, and the Republic of Nicaragua are taking part in the work of the session as observers.

At the opening of the meeting, the participants were warmly welcomed by Dascalescu, prime minister of the Romanian Government. The session then began examining the questions on the agenda. The report of the CEMA Executive Committee on CEMA's work between the 40th and 42d meetings in implementing the decisions of the economic conference of the CEMA member countries at summit level was delivered by Pacoste, chairman of the Executive Committee and permanent representative of Romania at CEMA. The participants are discussing draft programs for the construction of nuclear power stations and atomic heat supply stations during the period up to the year 2000. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who is heading the Soviet delegation, delivered a speech at the session. The session is continuing its work.

Ryzhkov Speaks

LD031901 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1625 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Bucharest, 3 Nov (TASS) — We are transmitting the text of a speech by Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the 42d sitting of the CEMA session, which opened here today.

Over the 18 months following the 40th session of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance, he said, there have been many events in the life of the countries of the socialist community, in our cooperation, in the international situation.

The congresses of fraternal parties were among the most important of these events. They summarized the results of the socioeconomic development of our countries over the preceding period and determined its future prospects. The documents from the congresses are convincing testimony to the fact that notwithstanding all international and external difficulties which we have faced during this period, the socialist economy has been developing steadily. Although the rates of growth have decreased slightly, on the whole they were 50 percent higher than in the capitalist economy.

The social policy of the countries of the community has been invariably aimed at securing the material well-being of the working people and improving the conditions of their work and spare time, safeguarding the environment, and developing culture.

One has to bear in mind that all this is taking place at a time when unemployment is increasing in capitalist countries, social programs are being cut and social-class differences and contradictions are showing themselves more and more acutely. During the last 5-year period, while one person was joining in social production in the European socialist countries, one person was being deprived of work in the capitalist countries of Western Europe. Every time a family moved into a new apartment in our countries, somebody was being deprived of housing in the capitalist world. It was precisely during the 1980's that in the industrially developed countries of the West people who were made homeless gradually began to form a new social layer of people who had been stricken by misfortune and deprived of their human rights.

The contrast between two worlds is clearly visible on the international arena, too. On the one side is the policy of militarism, reaction, and violence, and on the other is a readiness for broad cooperation for the sake of peace on an equitable and reciprocal basis. But objective conditions, the realities of the nuclear age say that the conflict between the two world systems can proceed only in forms of peaceful competition, and disputes be solved by political means.

The beginning of this year was marked by a major foreign policy initiative by the Soviet Union, which on 15 January proposed the well-known program of stage-by-stage liquidation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The 27th Congress of our Leninist Party proclaimed the concept of creating an all-embracing system of international security, in which due place is given not only to its military and political aspects, but also to the economic and humanitarian ones.

At the Budapest conference of their Political Consultative Committee, the Warsaw Pact member states, being in favor of an integrated approach to the problem of disarmament, put forward an impressive program for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, with a corresponding reduction in the military expenditure of states. We are still awaiting for a reply from the NATO countries to this proposal. The creation in the Balkans and in Central Europe of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, in accordance with the proposals of the Romanian Socialist Republic and the Bulgarian People's Republic, and of the GDR and the CSSR, would be an important contribution to the cause of riding Europe of such weapons.

An historical chance for a cardinal resolution to the problems of war and peace, for the removal of the nuclear threat, and for the development of the broadest possible international cooperation was created at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. The new, far-reaching Soviet proposals which M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, put forward at this meeting, have shown convincingly that a way out of the nuclear impasse is possible if the United States ceases to strive for military superiority, if the arms race is not transferred to space. In the struggle for nuclear disarmament a qualitatively new situation has been created which requires increased efforts to bring about radical reductions and the complete scrapping of nuclear weapons.

Both in international and in internal affairs all of us sense the great strength of our unity, the cohesion of the fraternal countries. This is especially important in view of the present complex situation in the world, at a time when the countries of the community are starting to tackle the increasingly large-scale tasks of socialist construction. This allows us to move forward more quickly to the goals we have set ourselves, to pinpoint more resolutely the reasons for negative phenomena, and to overcome our difficulties and shortcomings.

Despite all the diversity of condition in which the socialist countries find themselves, we are tackling many shared problems. The most important of them is the acceleration of socioeconomic development on the basis of the intensification of public-sector production and a cardinal increase in its efficiency. At the economic conference in Moscow we all bore in mind that the rendering of assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to the Republic of Cuba and to Mongolia in accelerating their development and increasing the efficiency of their national economies was one of the most important aims of cooperation. This common courses which we have coordinated shows that the strategy of acceleration is of fundamental importance, that it reflects the profound requirements of socialism at the present stage of development, and that it is affected by both internal and external factors.

The tasks set by the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the other fraternal parties to intensify the economy on the basis of scientific-technological progress, to strengthen the technological and economic invulnerability of the community, and to consolidate our unity and cohesion, also require radical changes in the system of mutual cooperation.

In order that the latter may effectively promote the reconstruction of production potential in each country of the community and the drastic enhancement of labor productivity, it must be concentrated primarily on the key areas of intensification of production and of acceleration of technological progress.

In order to ensure a close unification of efforts in the process of economic interaction and optimum variants of the utilization of national resources forms of cooperation which meet these requirements, a convergence of our economic and mechanisms and the creation of corresponding economic, administrative and legislative conditions are required.

At the new stage of development, which has now been embarked upon by the socialist system, new complex tasks are being put forward today. To solve them requires active, creative searching and enterprising action at all levels of economic management.

The 27th CPSU Congress confirmed our decisiveness to take a fresh step together with the fraternal countries in development of socialist economic integration already in the current 5-year plan period. Our party's Central Committee is aligning all state administration bodies and all links of the Soviet economic mechanism for the all-round expansion of cooperation with CEMA countries, and for making the fullest use of the advantages of the international socialist division of labor in order to intensify production.

In the plans for the 12th 5-Year Plan we are trying to reflect this line as specifically and fully as possible, and we are convinced that along with its implementation new opportunities will arise to expand our cooperation.

The first results of the work of the USSR's national economy over 9 months confirm this. The plan tasks both for volume of industrial output and for productivity of labor have been overfulfilled.

Raising the dynamic nature of economic development undoubtedly creates additional opportunities for deepening ties and expanding trade turnover with the fraternal countries. But the best results should be obtained through the introduction of long-term factors of economic growth, such as accelerating technical progress, intensifying and improving the structure of production and investments. We are far from failing to see or to minimize the difficulties which arise here. We have no cause for complacency and placidity here, nor should we have. In assessing results critically and soberly we realize that only small steps have been taken in many sectors and that the results we have achieved have been obtained mainly through what, so to speak, is "on the surface" -- strengthening order and discipline and better organization of matters.

A real turning point and a genuine restructuring may be ensured on the basis of the implementation of the deep-seated growth factors -- scientific and technological progress, structural policy and investment policy, and a radical raising of the quality of production. The restructuring of the economy is a complex process. The policy of socioeconomic acceleration in itself means restructuring in other areas of social activity.

The Soviet Union has embarked on a period of profound revolutionary transformations aimed at overcoming the negative tendencies of the 1970's and early 1980's, and on an accelerated switch to the intensive path, to raising quality and efficiency. It is stressed in the documents of the 27th Congress that for the specified aims to be achieved it is necessary to utilize more fully the opportunities of socialist economic integration.

Work is now going on in the Soviet Union to create a unified economic mechanism which can meet the demands of intensification. An organic part of it are the radical transformations in the system of external economic activity. They are of great significance for the development of the Soviet economy, for its interaction with other countries in the community, and for developing socialist integration. The essence of the transformations being implemented consists of the fact that the producers of output are being directly involved in external economic activity and the economic conditions are being created for enterprises to have an interest in it. In implementing this important reform we are, as before, striving foremost to develop links with fraternal socialist countries. They have for us a priority rating and this priority rating is ensured by a whole system of economic, legal, and organizational measures.

Principles which are characteristic of international socialist relations continue to be the basis of our mutual relations with fraternal socialist countries. These principles are equality, all-round consideration of interests, needs and possibilities, mutual advantage, and comradely mutual aid.

One of the main reasons for the reform which is being carried out in the Soviet Union is the desire to create a management mechanism to generate economic activities which will correspond to the needs of the present stage of development of the Soviet Union and of the countries of the community, and which will be in harmony with the requirements of the strategy of acceleration and socialist integration. This has been expressed through the fact that favorable conditions for direct ties, and for joint production and scientific-technical ventures are being created.

Without such transformations it will be difficult to make proper use of the advantages of the international socialist distribution of labor and to rise the effectiveness of our cooperation to such an extent that it becomes for all the CEMA countries an effective instrument of the implementation of the line toward accelerating scientific-technical progress. We are striving to link the solving of the most important tasks of the current 5-year plan with cooperation. The utilization of the combined scientific-technical potential of the community opens up fundamentally new opportunities for all our countries. At the same time we will understand that the close pooling of our efforts with the efforts of the other socialist countries will yield the proper return only when cooperation is based on deep mutual involvement and when it helps to economize on expenditure, to increase mutual trade, and to raise the technical level of production in our countries.

The building of a new and highly productive machinery and equipment can be classed first and foremost among just such tasks. The machine-building complex is given a special role -- the role of catalyst for scientific-technological progress. In the current 5-year plan period renovation of the active part of basic assets in the USSR's industry is to be speeded up by a factor of 3, while in machine-building the factor is more than 4.5.

Considerable opportunities for unification of efforts in science, technology, and production are also opening up in the area of efficient utilization of resources.

It is planned to cover 65-70 percent of the increase in requirements for fuel and raw materials through economizing, to reduce energy inputs by 8.5 percent, and to reduce the materials consumption of the national income by 14 percent. This is why we reckon that the results of the joint work during the period since the 40th council session have to be assessed primarily according to how fast our cooperation has been restructured to tasks of this kind and to what extent we have been successful in restructuring the very mechanism of our cooperation in order to bring it in line with the needs of the party. In essence we have been directed onto precisely this path by the decisions of the Moscow economic conference. Two main directions in their implementations can quite rightly be singled out: the adoption and the beginning of work on the comprehensive programs of scientific-technical progress of CEMA countries up to the year 2000, and coordination of plans for the current 5-year period.

Now we are all striving to make the comprehensive program of scientific and technological progress the central link in our cooperation for many years to come. It is necessary to solve very important issues concerning the development of the productive forces of the community countries. In terms of the profundity of the structural changes which its implementation in the economies of the CEMA countries and in the socialist international division of labor should bring about, the program is a unique phenomenon.

Joint research into the problem of the comprehensive program has started in our countries in the current year. This year alone, about 400 completed studies are being passed on to production areas. The necessary resources are being invested for this in our national economic plan. But organizational tasks have not come off the agenda, and are hardly likely to in the future. Provision for work under the program poses many questions at various levels. It is in the course of resolving them that a fully-fledged unified mechanism for management of the program, embracing all stages of work and clearly organizing the development of scientific-production joint ventures, will form and develop. There are many difficulties here. In a number of cases barriers arise within and between departments, and sometimes a bureaucratic style makes itself felt. And so we are all faced with a lot of work. We express our satisfaction that these issues will be examined in detail at our session, by mutual accord.

Another significant result of our joint work in the period that has passed has been the resolution of a number of major national economic problems in the course of coordination of plans for 1986-90. Some of them go far beyond the limits of that period. Bilateral programs for economic and scientific-technical cooperation up to the year 2000 have been signed. As a result of the coordination of plans, the national economies of the fraternal countries have been guaranteed fuel and raw material resources. Supplies of these from the USSR have been kept at a high level, and with respect to energy sources they will increase over the 5-year period by 116 million metric tons in terms of standard fuel. A form of cooperation that has been tested in action will be developed -- the joint construction of integrated projects. Major projects for supply of output to the fraternal countries will be under construction on the territory of the USSR. These are the new gas-pipeline from Yamburg to the western border of the USSR, the Krivoy Rog Mining and Enrichment Combine, and other new construction projects.

However, the head of the USSR Government continued, in a critical assessment of all that has been done it should be said frankly that the opportunities available for developing cooperation and increasing mutual trade are not being sufficiently used. In order to ensure a dynamic and proportionate growth in mutual economic ties, there must be a substantial change in the import and export structure, and an expansion of the export potential of each country, primarily as a result of the production of the latest technology.

This means that we must immediately move away from largely trading links toward interaction in production, toward a high degree of specialization and coproduction.

The CEMA countries agree that nowadays traditional methods are insufficient, that these methods cannot bring about an intensification of the economy and that we all need new ways of imparting dynamism to economic development and cooperation. Since we regard this as a most important political and economic task, we steadfastly advocate the use of new forms of cooperation, the utmost expansion of direct ties, and the creation of joint enterprises and organizations. At the present time about 300 Soviet enterprises have direct ties with enterprises in the fraternal countries. But up to now these ties have been arranged mainly by ministries. They were established "from above," so to speak. The share of coproduction in the overall volume of trade in machinery and technical output continues to be low and amounts to only 5-11 percent. These questions were not given the attention they deserve during the coordination of plans, either.

In order to get this work under way, the necessary conditions must be created to increase the interest of the enterprises themselves.

At the same time, N.I. Ryzhkov continued, alongside internal measures there is a need for appropriate restructuring in the international mechanism of cooperation as well. This mechanism should stimulate the development of direct coproduction links and the formation of joint economic organizations. Therefore, CEMA bodies should examine questions of further improving the economic instruments of cooperation, including the system of price-formation, currency-financial relations, and legal contractual forms.

A document has been submitted to our session for examination which will largely define the development of power engineering in the countries of the community. It is a program of construction of atomic power stations and heat supply stations envisaging by the year 2000 to bring the total power of atomic stations in CEMA countries, not including the USSR, to 50 million kilowatts against about 8 million kilowatts in 1986. The production of electricity at atomic power stations will amount to 30-40 percent of the total volume of its production. In the USSR, where this proportion is now about 11 percent, it is also planned to raise it to about 30 percent and to increase the power of atomic power stations by 5-6 times. In addition, we shall build atomic heat supply stations, saving valuable and scarce organic fuel -- gas and fuel oil.

This path was chosen as a result of a painstaking analysis of our growing requirements for electricity and heat, of ways of meeting them, and of world trends in scientific and technical progress in the area of power engineering. The tragedy at Chernobyl has not only not ended the prospects for nuclear power engineering as part of our cooperation; on the contrary, by focusing attention on ways of achieving greater safety, it has increased its importance as the sole source which can guarantee reliable power supplies in the future. The collective program lays a solid basis for this. The socialist countries are involving themselves still more actively in international cooperation in this field, on the basis of the proposals submitted by us to the IAEA.

In order to cope successfully with the tasks of the program a significant increase in the production of atomic equipment, an expansion in coproduction, and an addition to the agreements operating on these issues will all be required.

An indispensable condition must be the undertaking of firm pledges to guarantee the use of capacities for the production of atomic equipment which have been developed by the countries to make provision for the program to produce atomic stations.

This requirement has a sound basis when it is considered that the program which we have undertaken for the construction of nuclear power stations in the period up to the year 1990 turned out to be unfulfilled by a half and those countries which introduced the corresponding atomic engineering capacities suffered from this.

It is also important to coordinate the implementation of the program with the fulfillment of measures for the appropriate section of the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress in order to ensure that construction of nuclear stations is carried out at the very highest technical level and the most advanced methods of safeguarding their security are employed. It would be expedient to organize a conference for specialists from our countries on matters involving the creation of new generation reactor systems.

External conditions for the economic development of the countries of the community remain complex. Imperialism is using the weapons of economic warfare against us, including credit blockades and various sorts of embargo. The instability of the state of the capitalist market has an unfavorable influence on our mutual trade as well. But the main thing is that international tension is being maintained and the threat of nuclear war has not been eliminated. After the new Soviet proposals were put forward in Reykjavik on some of the most important questions of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons the struggle to create peaceful conditions for the socioeconomic development of all states and peoples entered an exceptionally important stage. It demands active efforts and still more purposeful actions on the part of states in the socialist community and of all peaceloving forces.

The positive results of the first stage of the Stockholm conference and the adoption by the IAEA of conventions on providing notification and assistance in the event of nuclear accidents indicates that the shoots of the new political thinking are still appearing. And now the possibility is emerging that they may be further reinforced during the all-European conference which will open tomorrow in Vienna.

It is called upon to help strengthen trust in economic relations between states and eliminate obstacles to the development of mutually advantageous ties in the economy, science, technology, and protection of the environment. The establishment of official relations between the CEMA and individual CEMA member-countries, on the one hand, and the EEC, on the other, could serve the expansion of economic and political cooperation in Europe. Business ties between these two major integrated organizations would be in the interests of both sides and would help to strengthen the material basis of European and universal security.

The socialist community supports the struggle of the nonaligned states for the restructuring of international economic relations. During the period since the 40th CEMA session these states have experienced still more acutely the negative consequences of the world economic crisis. The problem of their external debts has worsened sharply. All this threatens to cause serious upheaval in the financial and economic area, in world trade. Strategically changes in the structure of world economic ties might be a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples of these countries. Therefore, we share the concern at the present state of world economic relations, which was expressed in the economic declaration adopted in Harare. The need for a global and just solution to the most important international economic problems is now quite pressing. The growing protectionism in world trade, the wide-scale use by the imperialist states of sanctions, embargoes, and discrimination for political motives cannot be considered normal.

The U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola, which are defending their right to determine their own destiny independently is a provocation to the world community.

The USSR, like the other fraternal countries, consistently follows a policy aimed at strengthening relations with the developing nations. In this connection the coordination of efforts by the CEMA member-countries on a multilateral basis and the coordination of their programs to render assistance to the developing nations, acquires even greater significance.

Possessing immense economic and scientific-technological potential, the CEMA member-countries have thousands of threads which tie them in with the economies of states in various parts of the world, N.I. Ryzhkov said in conclusion. The implementation of our economic plans, the growing unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community, and their resolve to reach new socioeconomic horizons, create reliable preconditions for the expansion and deepening of cooperation with the developing countries, and also for mutually beneficial business relations with the capitalist states. The strengthening of international ties and of the economic positions of the socialist community serves the interests of our peoples, and the cause of progress and peace worldwide.

The Executive Committee's report reflects all the diversity of efforts being undertaken by our countries in their striving to advance along the path of progress, and their readiness for broad and constructive cooperation with all countries of the world. We support the proposal that the work of the Executive Committee be endorsed. We express confidence that today's exchange of opinions will serve to accelerate the development of the socialist community.

ECONOMISTS' 'ROUND TABLE' HELD IN TBILISI

PM311528 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 3

[T. Chanturiya report: "Economists at a 'Round Table'"]

[Text] Tbilisi -- Leading economists from our country and their colleagues from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have gathered in Tbilisi at a "round table" to discuss topical problems of the criticism of current anti-Marxist conceptions of the socialist economy.

"The concept of the acceleration of the socialist society's socioeconomic development," T.N. Chikvaidze, deputy director of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Law, says, "has given rise to a new wave of the ideological offensive in the West. The attack is carried out by economists, among others: They spread the myth that our plans are unrealizable and misrepresent both the aims and the means of the restructuring we have launched. We must use all the methods of economic science to promote the speediest development of the 'new way of thinking.'"

CONTINUING REPORTAGE ON VIENNA CSCE MEETING

IZVESTIYA Previews Followup

PM031259 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[L. Kamynin article: "From Madrid to Vienna"]

[Text] On the map it does not look far from Madrid to Vienna. But the time separating the meeting representatives of states taking part in the CSCE which opens in the Austrian capital on 4 November 1986 from the same meeting held in the Spanish capital between 1980 and 1983 is so full of significant and sometimes contradictory events in international life that political commentators are writing about the difficult path traveled by Europe from Madrid to Vienna.

What has happened in the all-European process in that time? What are the positive and negative results? What are the CSCE participants bringing to their next meeting in the Austrian capital? This is described in a report by the Soviet committee for European security and cooperation, published by the "Progress" publishing house, which is about the course of the all-European process based on the Helsinki Final Act. The report is thus called "From Madrid to Vienna."

During this time the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have put forward a whole series of large-scale initiatives which accord fully with the recommendations enshrined in the Madrid meeting's final document. The purpose of those initiatives is to protect the common home of the peoples inhabiting Europe from nuclear conflagration. At the same time the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act provisions and the Madrid meeting recommendations was complicated and in a number of instances blocked by the actions of the United States and a number of its NATO partners.

One important result of the Madrid meeting was the accord on convening the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm in January 1984. Continued until fall 1986, the passage of this conference was difficult. Until the very last minute the fate of the accords ultimately reached hung by a thread. But the participants managed to overcome the differences to reach important agreements and take a major step toward easing tension and improving the political climate in Europe. Favorable preconditions were thereby created for the approaching Vienna meeting.

But the final documents produced at two other conferences held by decision of the Madrid meeting -- the conference on human rights held in Ottawa (May-June 1985) and the conference on contacts among people held in Bern (April-May 1986) -- were not adopted. Representatives of 33 European countries plus the United States and Canada took part in them.

Being convinced that cooperation in the human rights sphere is both necessary and possible, the Soviet delegation based its activity in Ottawa on the concept of that question formulated in the USSR -- a concept expressed in concrete measures in the sphere of safeguarding basic human rights and freedoms.

The NATO countries tried to turn the conference into a "show" with expatiations about imaginary human rights violations in the Soviet Union. But at the same time they wanted to ignore the flagrant and massive human rights violations in the West.
[paragraph continues]

For that reason they did not like the detailed final document, proposed by the delegations of the USSR and other socialist states, which envisaged concrete measures to carry out the Final Act provisions on respecting human rights and basic freedoms. They rejected it.

In Bern the Soviet delegation put forward a whole package of concrete proposals enabling contacts among people to be expanded and facilitated. In this respect the Soviet Union has done a lot unilaterally. The intergovernmental agreements concluded between the USSR and a number of countries party to the all-European process have also made an important contribution to developing contacts. Our country supports the humane and positive examination of concrete questions of the development of contacts among people, the reuniting of families, marriage between citizens of different states, and so forth.

In past decades a total of more than 300,000 people have taken up permanent residence in the Soviet Union and acquired Soviet citizenship and approximately the same number of people have left the USSR to take up permanent residence in foreign countries.

The Bern conference drew up a generally acceptable compromise draft final document, which was approved in advance by the delegations of all the member countries. But a few hours before the conference ended the U.S. delegation announced that it had been instructed by Washington to oppose the adoption of the final document. This action demonstrated the United States' utter disregard of Europe's interests and of the needs and aspirations of millions of people.

Since the recent meeting in Reykjavik, where the world stood literally a step away from historic decisions, the situation has undergone great qualitative changes. It is in these conditions that the Vienna meeting of representatives of countries party to the All-European conference will be held. It should prove to be another landmark on Europe's path toward improved cooperation and reliable peace.

Mikhaylov on Meeting Prospects

PM031525 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 86 First Edition p 6

[Article by V. Mikhaylov: "From Stockholm to Vienna"]

[Text] A meeting of the states that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opens in Vienna 4 November. The foreign ministers of 35 states are assembling there. This is an expression of today's chief trend: The time has come for all states to make a decisive effort and take specific actions to halt material preparations for nuclear war and shape an all-embracing system of international security, primarily through disarmament.

In the qualitatively new situation created by the Soviet initiatives in the disarmament sphere, this meeting is intended to be an important milestone in movement toward reliable security and to aid the implementation of real measures to improve the climate in our continent and the world over.

It is a little over 11 years since 1975, when for the first time in history representatives of European states and the United States and Canada assembled in Helsinki and signed the Final Act. It is a minuscule period compared with the millennia of European history with its "holy" alliances and bloody wars. [paragraph continues]

But in that historically brief period the all-European process, despite the exacerbation of tension since the early eighties, has become an established part of the continent's life and has put down deep roots in the consciousness of all European countries displaying an interest in its continuation and development.

All-European meetings were held in Belgrade and Madrid in furtherance of the Helsinki process. In the Spanish capital in 1983 guidelines were elaborated for the development of the provisions of the Final Act. They took into account the important fact that the all-European process embraces all the main aspects of interstate relations -- political, military, economic, and humanitarian. Mandates were issued for holding experts' conferences: on human rights in Ottawa, on matters pertaining to ensuring contacts between people in Bern, and a cultural forum in Budapest. A conference was convened in Stockholm to elaborate political and military confidence-building measures. Its first stage ended successfully recently. This demonstrated that the first shoots of the new political thinking are strengthening.

Now it is the job of the Vienna meeting not only to discuss the results of Stockholm and the experts' conferences, but to elaborate the paths of further progress in strengthening security and peaceful cooperation in Europe.

The all-European process is not taking place in a vacuum. The period from the start of the Stockholm conference in January 1984 to the upcoming Vienna meeting has been packed with a multitude of events, often multifaceted and frequently containing conflicting features.

It was precisely these years that witnessed the start of the siting of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles on the European Continent. The United States perpetrated its intervention against Grenada and its attack on Libya. The "Star Wars" program conceived in Washington began to acquire sinister shape, and the predictability of U.S. policy began to decline dangerously.

But it was in this same period that the Soviet Union put forward a detailed program to deliver mankind from nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons. Reinforcing this program with specific actions, the USSR announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The Warsaw Pact states put forward an initiative aimed at a decisive reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Last November there was a Soviet-American summit in Geneva at which the two powers' leaders jointly stated that there can be no victors in a nuclear war and that it must never be unleashed.

And finally -- Reykjavik.

The results of the Reykjavik meeting and its lessons will be a factor in Vienna as well. They illuminated the real prospects of nuclear disarmament. Had the U.S. Administration gone along with the Soviet proposal on strengthening the ABM Treaty the number of strategic weapons in the world would have been cut by one-half over the next 5 years and all -- U.S. and Soviet -- medium-range missiles would have vanished from European soil. So as far as Europe is concerned the issue of whether or not there is going to be an arms race in near-earth space is not a side issue. After Reykjavik the efforts to justify certain countries' joining in the U.S. SDI by claiming that they would only be participating in a research program [issledovatel'skaya programma] have lost all plausibility. [paragraph continues]

It is not a matter of theoretical research [teoreticheskiye izyskaniya] but of practical preparations [prakticheskaya podgotovka] for placing strike weapons in near-earth orbits and creating [sozdaniye] new and even more devastating means of destruction. This affects all continents -- not the least of which is Europe.

Great disarmament opportunities were revealed in Reykjavik, primarily as a result of the abandonment of trivia and petty mathematics, as a result of the bold switch to large-scale decisions. That was the Soviet approach in Reykjavik to the burning problems of the day, as a result of which the process of elaborating practical decisions on halting the arms race received a powerful boost. The utilization of this experience could be beneficial at the upcoming meeting in the Austrian capital.

The Stockholm conference has passed on to the Vienna meeting a substantial package of political and military technical measures on reducing the risk of war in Europe and strengthening security and mutual trust on our continent. Compared with the provisions of the Final Act, they have been considerably expanded and supplemented with new measures.

The principle of not using or threatening force was concretized and consolidated in the Stockholm final document. It is essential to introduce this fundamental provision of modern international law into European practice. The nature of today's weapons means that no state can hope to defend itself by military means alone. Europe, with its high population density and excessive concentration of armaments, would be more vulnerable than any other continent in the event of an armed, especially nuclear, conflict.

The package of military-technical confidence- and security-building measures which comes into effect 1 January 1987 has been supplemented with important provisions such as the pledge to exchange annual plans for notifiable military activity. For the first time, aside from national means of monitoring [kontrol] this activity, a system of inspections is being introduced. (The full text of the conference decisions was published in the Soviet press.)

The Stockholm document is the first major agreement in the military-political sphere since the signing of the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty. After a lengthy period of stagnation in matters of limiting the danger of military confrontation it is an undoubted victory for common sense, a gain for all the 35 states participating in the all-European conference. By its very nature the all-European process accords with European political tasks in the context of the new approach to international affairs and the new thinking on questions of peace and the development of the chief principles of peaceful interstate relations which the Soviet Union has always upheld.

It is now up to the Vienna meeting. After the first stage in Stockholm, it has first of all to pave the way to a transition to the second stage -- to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. A solid foundation already exists for this difficult task, a task of importance to the destiny of detente.

First of all there is the proposal by the Warsaw Pact states to the NATO states, consisting of a detailed program of major cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals. The program envisages, in particular, that the strength of the opposing military-political alliances' forces will be reduced over a period of 1-2 years by 100,000-150,000 men on each side, and tactical strike aircraft will be cut also. [paragraph continues]

Immediately after this the Warsaw Pact states will be prepared to embark on further considerable cuts as a result of which, given reciprocal willingness on the part of the NATO countries, in the early nineties ground forces and tactical strike aircraft would have been cut by approximately 25 percent compared with the present level, that is, over 500,000 men on each side. Given an objective approach to these proposals, they could serve as a good basis for future work at the second stage of the Stockholm conference. Also handed down from the first stage is the question of extending confidence-building measures to independent [samostoyatelnyye] naval and air force operations, limiting the size of exercises, and, finally, extending confidence-building measures to the territory of all the participating states, without exception.

The climate of international contacts in Europe depends to a considerable extent on the intensity and depth of cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and environmental spheres. But the level of cooperation in these areas still falls short of the Helsinki Final Act guidelines. What is needed here is an innovative approach, in particular, in the search for new forms of collaboration and the international division of labor. The Soviet Union, which has entered the phase of the dynamic restructuring of the national economy, is ready for such a quest. The more efficient utilization of complementary facilities in East and West and the removal of artificial restrictions and barriers from ties between them would increase the potential of the entire continent and, consequently, strengthen its positions in the world. The Vienna meeting can and must speak out on this important matter.

In Vienna the closest attention should be given to developing a mutually enriching exchange of spiritual values, providing the European peoples with more extensive information about one another's lives, and inculcating in the younger generation a sense of mutual respect -- in short, in the humanitarian sphere.

The Soviet Union attaches the greatest significance to questions of safeguarding human rights and basic freedoms. Among the values of the socialist way of life the human individual is supreme. The creation of the most favorable conditions for people's spiritual and physical development is socialist society's chief aim. It was born for that and it lives by that. The USSR is an ardent advocate of all-European cooperation in that sphere too. This cooperation is hampered by the hypocrisy and speculation of those who want to use humanitarian problems to kindle enmity and hatred, in order to be able to continue forcing on the arms race without hindrance. The Bern conference of experts on human rights demonstrated who is actually opposed to all-European cooperation in defending and asserting human rights. The adoption of a final document at the Bern conference, envisaging a considerable development of collaboration, was blocked by the United States, which had no qualms about opposing all the other participants.

Whatever sphere of international relations in the European continent you choose, the USSR is always open to broad, innovative solutions. Our country wants the Vienna meeting to be held in a positive vein and it wants to see it achieve substantial accords. These should promote the further development of the provisions of all sections of the Helsinki Final Act and the important accords reached at the Stockholm conference.

Europe, with its inherent creative spirit, has every opportunity to transform itself into the model of an all-embracing system of security and cooperation. The Vienna meeting could be an important stage on the path of accomplishing this noble mission which is of relevance to the whole of mankind.

Pre-Meeting Atmosphere Viewed

PMO40951 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Special Correspondents B. Dubrovin and V. Mikhyalov report: "Vienna: On the Eve of the Meeting"]

[Text] Vienna, 3 Nov -- Here, in one of the most ancient centers of European and world civilization, you can sense particularly keenly the need to defend our continent against nuclear destruction. That is the aim of the meeting that opens in Vienna tomorrow -- the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The foreign ministers of 33 European countries as well as of the United States and Canada are coming to Vienna. This high level indicates the growing awareness of the need for an urgency of effective actions for the sake of the continent's peaceful future. The international situation is now such that great significance is being attached to the Vienna forum regarding the progress of the new political thinking capable of bringing mankind to the path of lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Viennese, with their customary hospitality, have done much to create favorable working conditions for the participants in the meeting. It goes without saying that the Austrians themselves are interested in the successful outcome of the forum. "Europe has long been of special significance to Austrian foreign policy." Austrian Chancellor F. Vranitzky stated. "Here, too, an exceptional role should be played by the Vienna meeting which is to be the point of departure for the new phase of the European policy of detente."

The Hofburg Palace is ready for the meeting. The press center is crammed with journalists. Today they number almost 1,000. Representatives have come from the major newspapers and news agencies not only of Europe but also of Asia, Africa, North and South America, and even Australia.

But, of course, the interest of the European countries themselves is particularly great. "The Vienna meeting," Belgian Foreign Relations Minister L. Tindemans has stated, "could be an important milestone on the path to disarmament and detente."

That view is understandable. Many people have seen a real opportunity for decisive improvements on the path to disarmament in the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik and in the Stockholm conference.

Of course, it is not as simple as that on the eve of the Vienna meeting. For example, a U.S. State Department spokesman has announced in Washington that "the United States will strive to achieve a significant improvement in the observance by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries of their commitments adopted within the framework of the CSCE." What is this other than an orientation toward confrontation and an attempt to transform the meeting into an arena of altercation and reciprocal accusations?! Is not this maneuver intended so as to divert public attention from the continuing U.S. and NATO actions designed to fuel the danger of war in Europe? Is that not why "fighters" from all manner of political subversion centers on the CIA payroll have been dispatched to Vienna, clearly on orders from across the ocean?

However, they are not the ones who set the tone in Vienna.

Europeans can and must direct all their inherent creative spirit toward the dynamic transformation of their continent into a new edifice of peaceful and beneficial interstate relations. The Vienna meeting can be an important stage in the fulfillment of this lofty mission, which is common to all mankind.

Shevardnadze Arrives in Vienna

PM031500 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

["Arrival in Austrian Capital" -- IZVESTIYA Headline]

[Text] On 2 November, E.A. Shevardnadze arrived in Vienna. He made the following statement for the press upon his arrival:

I would like to express the idea that the Vienna meeting of the representatives of member-states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could not be more timely. Had it not been in Europe's political calendar it should be urgently included there. Such is the international situation now, such are the historical circumstances which require from us effective immediate actions.

This is even more urgent after Reykjavik where an understanding on the necessity and possibility to relieve Europe of nuclear weapons was reached, an understanding so vital for the continent. The results of the summit in the capital of Iceland make us take new stock of the European and world realities. Quoting M.S. Gorbachev, the reality of our time forcefully demands from us a new mode of political thinking which alone can lead humanity on to the road towards lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

We attach much importance to the work of the all-European forum. We deem it necessary to conduct it dynamically, in a constructive spirit. The Soviet delegation is ready to cooperate with the representatives of all European states, the United States of America and Canada so that the Vienna meeting would end in substantial positive results.

We are pleased to be in Austria, the country, whose neutrality corresponds so effectively to its own national interests and the interests of universal peace.

I take this opportunity to convey our best wishes to the Austrian people and the citizens of Vienna.

Meets Austrian CP Leader

LD032209 Moscow TASS in English 2047 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Vienna November 3 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, today met with Franz Muhri, chairman of the Communist Party of Austria.

Eduard Shevardnadze briefed Franz Muhri on the Soviet communists' active and purposeful work to fulfill the decisions of the 27th party congress on home and foreign policies.

The chairman of the Communist Party of Austria spoke about the Austrian communists' campaign for the social rights of the working people, peace and democracy.

Eduard Shevardnadze and Franz Muhri called for further developing Soviet-Austrian relations in the interests of ensuring European security, achieving a lasting nuclear-free world peace, and strengthening the fraternal friendship and international solidarity between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Austria.

The conversation passed in a warm, comradely atmosphere.

Meets With Austrian Officials

LD032100 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1920 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Vienna, 3 Nov (TASS) -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, had a meeting today with Kurt Waldheim, federal president of Austria. The sides confirmed their interest in further developing the fruitful bilateral cooperation in various fields based on the Austrian State Accord of 1955 and the Austrian status of permanent neutrality. During the exchange of opinions on topical international problems, attention was paid to the meeting of representatives from the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, due to open on 4 November in Vienna. The success of the meeting could become a significant step in making the world's political climate healthier and bringing about favorable conditions for establishing new relations between states which correspond to the requirements of our time.

Also today, there was a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor of Austria. During the conversation, which was held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, the sides gave a positive evaluation to the current state of bilateral cooperation and expressed mutual readiness to assist in further developing good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Austria in political economic, cultural, and other fields.

Discussing topical problems of world politics, E. Shevardnadze drew the Austrian chancellor's attention to the complex of new and large-scale initiatives put forward in Reykjavik by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, implementation of which could start the liquidation of nuclear arms and fundamental breakthrough for the better in the international situation. The mutual interest of the USSR and Austria in containing the all-European process was confirmed. The importance of a constructive meeting in Vienna for the purposes of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe and the world as a whole was noted.

Today, Eduard Shevardnadze met with Peter Jankowitsch, Austrian minister for foreign affairs. An exchange of opinions on certain aspects of bilateral relations and a number of topical international issues took place. It was stressed that the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik was one of the most important events in international life. The ministers expressed their conviction of the need to step up efforts by all states, regardless of size, for implementing concrete measures to maintain and consolidate European and universal peace, and to reduce arms -- primarily nuclear arms. Adherence by both countries to the development of the all-European process in all fields and the intention to assist in conducting the Vienna meeting of representatives from the CSCE member countries in a constructive and businesslike spirit, was confirmed.

Eduard Shevardnadze today met with Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA. E. Shevardnadze drew H. Blix's attention to the essence of the far-reaching Soviet initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev during the recent Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union's principled support for the work of the IAEA, which is playing an important role in the cause of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, of the continued development of cooperation between states in the field of peaceful utilization and strengthening of nuclear energy safety procedures, was stated.

H. Blix spoke highly of the enterprising proposals and the role of the Soviet Union in deepening international joint action in the development of nuclear power engineering.

The sides noted with satisfaction that, as a result of collective efforts and shared experience, within the framework of the IAEA important international conventions on notification and on assistance in case of nuclear accidents were speedily drafted and adopted. These conventions strengthen the atmosphere of trust in international relations and are an example of the new political thinking oriented toward the peaceful use of mankind's opportunities.

Talks With UK's Howe

LD041124 Moscow TASS in English 1108 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Vienna November 4 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, had a conversation with the British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Sir Geoffrey Howe. They are in the Austrian capital in connection with the opening of the Vienna meeting of representatives of participatory countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

During their exchange of views the ministers discussed some pressing international problems in the light of the qualitatively new situation in the world as a result of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that every state now must display realism, political courage and a high sense of responsibility when opting for decisions in line with the spirit of the time.

The hope was expressed that Britain would determine its place in this historic process and make a practical contribution, in accordance with its weight in international affairs, to the common efforts to create a nuclear-free world and avert an arms race in outer space.

The ministers noted their mutual interest in deepening and perfecting the CSCE process on the basis of making fuller use of the potential of the CSCE Final Act, the Madrid and Stockholm accords.

The ministers declared in favour of continuing the Soviet-British political dialogue in the interests of expanding understanding, intensifying mutually advantageous ties and contacts between the two countries in various fields of practical cooperation.

'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD010114 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 31 Oct 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program presented by foreign affairs commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev; with political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; Igor Surguchev, not further identified; commentator Pavel Kasparov; international affairs journalist Aleksandr Lyutyy, and Sergey Pravdan, not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Lavrentyev] In the past week our editorial office has received an unusually large number of letters representing a sort of response by Soviet people to the Reykjavik meeting. They express with great emotion and interest the hope that it will nonetheless be possible to promote the cause of peace and force the U.S. Administration to take account of the will of peoples and stop avoiding the solution of pressing problems. Letters supporting our government's course aimed at finding a cardinal solution to the problems of disarmament have been sent in by Comrade Sokolova from Moscow, Comrade Mokin from Sverdlovsk, the Baranov and Yudin families from Chelyabinsk, Mariya Nikolayevna Krivenkova from the villages of Berezovskaya in Volgograd Oblast, Pavel Vasilyevich Ignatyev from Kostroma Oblast, and many others. But there are also letters, the writers of which, such as Mikhail Vasilyevich Yerumchak from Kiev, are indignant at Washington's obstructionist position and ask whether there is any point at all in doing business with the U.S. Administration. I will ask political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin to answer this and a number of other questions on the same topic.

[Shishlin] That, of course, is a serious question and, I think, even to some degree well-founded, because we have had experience of relations with this administration for many years, and unfortunately it has to be noted that over the last 6 years that the current administration led by President Reagan has been at the helm we have not been able to sign a single agreement with the United States that would be aimed at limiting arms, not to mention curbing the arms race. But as far as the dismantling of the existing arms control mechanism is concerned, in this respect the current administration has had success.

I don't know how these remaining 2 months of 1986 will go, but Washington has had the intention of dismantling the 1972 interim agreement, which was called SALT I, and of scrapping the SALT II treaty, which in fact was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. What is more, the current U.S. Administration has been weakening and gradually undermining the ABM Treaty, as a result of the intensive schemes to realize the ambitious Star Wars program, or, as it is also called, the strategic defense initiative.

However, returning to the question of whether there is any point in doing business with the current U.S. Administration: Although I repeat that this is a serious question and it is worth asking, the response to it of course, can only be to reject it. There are certain political situations -- and we are in one such now -- when the word no is simply unacceptable. We do have to do business with this Administration, but we also have to proceed from the fact that there is no time to lose, and not as much time to talk as to act. I would like to draw the listeners' attention to the fact that the Reykjavik meeting in fact showed that the possibility of trying to reach agreement, even with the current U.S. Administration, does exist. True, after Reykjavik the U.S. Administration was emitting contradictory signals, but I get the impression that all in all it was somehow disoriented by the impressive and large-scale proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, because the U.S. President and his entourage clearly had the impression that there could be a meeting in Reykjavik, that there could be talk about certain things, that the date of a new full-scale Soviet-U.S. meeting could be fixed, and that they could rest at that.

But something different happened. Reykjavik was turned by the Soviet Union, or in practical terms by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, into the channel of very profound, specific, working discussions. Then, when these working, businesslike discussions got off the ground, it became clear that it was possible to negotiate for agreement. And in fact we were, as they say, 5 minutes away from reaching a fundamental accord, had it not been for the stubborn adherence by the U.S. Administration to this SDI program, the Star Wars program. So we must do business with the current U.S. Administration. We must not lose what was gained in Reykjavik. We have to pursue our work now on the basis of what was done and what was implemented in the Icelandic capital.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, our letters also contain this question. Our proposals are clearly in the interests of West Europe, but the European NATO allies of the United States are suddenly for some reason starting to play up to Washington. What is the reason for this: bloc discipline or something else?

[Shishlin] That question requires quite a lengthy explanation, but I will try and give a more or less brief reply. First, this Atlantic discipline, or North Atlantic solidarity -- call it what you like -- is a reality, a political reality, and we could expect nothing else from the West European countries with regard to their approach to the U.S. position. So this is nothing new, it's nothing phenomenal: It's quite a routine thing for the NATO countries, when developments reach an acute turning point, to demonstrate, to use a phrase, a united front. But we mustn't just look at the surface of these events. The United Front is indeed a reality, but at the same time it is to some degree a myth, because the West Europeans have different interests from the United States. If the United States pursues here, there and everywhere an imperial policy, a policy of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, then the West European partners of the United States may sacrifice West European interests within the framework of a global confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist world. These fears make themselves felt in the political action, the political steps, that are taken by the West.

What I have in mind in this case is not, for example, meetings such as the recent session of the Nuclear Planning Group in some little place in Scotland, where of course overall NATO discipline is highlighted. What I have in mind is the bilateral talks that we and the other European socialist countries hold with our West European neighbors. Danish Prime Minister Schlueter, for example, was recently in Moscow, and his talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were, in his own assessment, fruitful and simply gripping. That is exactly so, because whether it is Danish Prime Minister Schuelter, or the leader or any other West European country they discover in talks with representatives of the socialist section of Europe that we have common interests, and these common interests are not limited to interests of preserving peace in this fragile European home of ours; they also include the need to develop peaceful, businesslike cooperation and a joint approach to pan-European problems.

So I think that while we can say there is a bloc discipline, we must nevertheless not put everything down to bloc discipline and see in the political picture of Europe today only this bloc discipline. Generally speaking, the opposition political parties in West Europe are feeling freer in this matter, more confident. They are reacting in a more lively way, as it were, more positively to the action by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik. In government circles, too, of course, there is an understanding of the fact that the Soviet Union really is striving for a nuclear-free world, and not some time in the remote future, but right now, being of the opinion that practical work must be started on dismantling these unwieldy military machines that have been pieced together over the decades.

So what I think is that now, after Reykjavik, not only has the door not been slammed in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but neither has a single door been slammed in the relations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries with the West European countries.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, was there any progress in Reykjavik during the discussion of regional conflicts? This problem interests, among others, Comrade Zavyalov from Moscow.

[Shishlin] Naturally at the forefront in Reykjavik were issues connected with limiting and curbing the arms race. Indeed the discussion there was about a qualitatively new approach, when it was not simply some sort of limits or sublimits to the nuclear arms race that were made the most important topic. There really was discussion about a radical reduction, and I think that henceforth the discussion will be only about a radical reduction of nuclear weapons. However, the question of regional conflicts and ways of overcoming them was also raised during the talks by the leaders of the two states. The Soviet Union is in favor of overcoming regional conflicts. It is ready to discuss them in the most detailed and thorough way, guided in fact by two principles: first, the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and second, strict respect for the right of peoples to freely choose their own path to the future and their own social system. However, it appears that the United States is not in fact ready for this.

The United States is still guilty of the policy of neoglobalism, which is continually manifested in the specific acts taken by the United States on the international scene. Whether you take Central America, or the situation around Afghanistan, or the situation in the Middle East, or the situation in southern Africa, we discover everywhere that the United States is trying to build up its military presence or the economic and political pressure on one country or the other to have everything performed according to U.S. scenarios. But it cannot be that way, because U.S. policy is aimed, whether Washington wants it or not, at taking the political situation back to somewhere that it was before, when essentially they want to turn back the processes of social development, and this has no prospect. Of course, social processes may recoil, they may deviate from their path, but in the final analysis the process of the social development of a society on its national soil is, of course, unstoppable. In the final analysis the danger of regional conflicts lies in the fact that their boundaries become dangerously blurred. These regional conflicts affect both international relations as a whole and Soviet-U.S. relations. So the elements of some sort of mutual understanding, the elements of restraint, are just simply necessary here. In Reykjavik in fact there was an understanding that consultations, the dialogue, the discussion of regional problems -- and the most acute of all the regional problems that exist in the world -- must be continued. I believe that such discussions, even when they don't lead to a direct result, are of course simply necessary to cool down as much as possible the hotbeds of our world.

[Lavrentyev] Thank you, Nikolay Vladimirovich. I would like to say that there are very many letters relating to the Reykjavik meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States. Because of time constraints we have not had the opportunity to answer all the questions, but we will try to answer a question that has been asked most often. I mean the question about what SDI is. Our permanent listener Aleksey Mikhaylovich Alikoy from Tomsk asks us to explain this word. SDI is an abbreviation for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative -- a program for setting up an antimissile defense with space-based elements. In everyday speech it has become known under a different name, the Star Wars program. In fact, the Americans have given it this label themselves, to be more specific, it was Senator Kennedy.

The Star Wars program, or SDI, as I will be using the official name, plans to set up the means of interception of ICBM's in all sections of their flight route: at the beginning when the missile engines ignite, in the postlaunch stage when the warhead of the missile is being divided into individual warheads, in the middle stage when the warheads are flying freely in space and at the concluding stage when they reenter the atmosphere near their targets. This idea of SDI meets the task by its author: to set up an antimissile defense that will come near to being universal.

In order to carry out this program new types of weapons are required. These are, first of all, weapons based on directed energy beams, chemical, [word indistinct] and x-ray lasers, neutral [as heard] particle generators. Some of them are to be deployed on earth, others in space, and another group are to be delivered to the area of interception by special missiles. It is proposed that large mirrors and lenses will be sited both in space and on earth to reflect and focus directed beams. Another category of space weapons is new types of homing missiles including space-based ones -- that is, they will be stationed on satellites.

What I have talked about is only part of the program, but it gives a general idea. It is not difficult to see that this is a program to create a new class of weapons. Its implementation is a new twist in the arms race spiral. In Washington they keep saying that these weapons are, as it were, assigned for defensive purposes. But first they can be used at anytime for offensive purposes as well. One has to be extremely naive to derive one's security from such assurances. Second, the very idea that they have proposed is faulty. It is suggested to strengthen U.S. national security by creating new types of weapons, whereas it is the weapons that they already have that have put this security under a question mark. Our position, as you know it, is different. Strengthening national security in the nuclear missile era can only follow the path of liquidating nuclear weapons and preventing the militarization of space. [passage omitted]

[Lavrentyev] Sergey Lvovich Potchevalov, a listener in Moscow, asks us to talk about the Voice of America radio station. Who molds its political face and determines the content of its programs, he asks. International affairs journalist Aleksandr Lyutyy replies to Comrade Potchevalov:

[Lyutyy] On Washington's Independence Avenue, not far from Congress, there is a gray and rather gloomy-looking 8-story building. On one side of the entrance is a sign saying Department of Health and Human Services. On the other side it says Voice of America. Yes, two departments with very different functions are accommodated in the same building. During my journalistic work I have had to visit the Voice of America several times. When I went there for the first time, the fact that these two departments were neighbors amazed me. However, appearances are not important. The building on Independence Avenue, which is bristling with aerials, houses the studios of the main radio-mouthpiece of Washington's foreign policy propaganda.

Here are some figures. Voice of America broadcasts for more than 1,300 hours a week in 42 different languages. But the radio does not hide the fact that its main function is to broadcast to our country. Its Russian output alone, for example, is about 18 hours a day. Furthermore, there are plans to steadily increase it. To this end, in various parts of the world old transmitters are being modernized and new ones are being built, including powerful, 500-kilowatt units. Recently, for example, the U.S. Administration concluded an agreement with Israel on the construction of modern transmitters in that country, to beam programs to the Soviet Union, above all the Central Asian republics of the USSR.

The need for financial savings, which is often spoken of by the White House and Congress, does not apply to Voice of America. Altogether 41.3 billion have been allocated to the 5-year program for the modernization of the radio station's technical capacity. The radio station can even rival the Pentagon in terms of growth in funding. More and more studios, fitted out with the most up-to-date equipment, are being opened at the headquarters on Independence Avenue in Washington. I myself can testify to the fact that the main control and information console at the radio station looks like a minikingdom of computers and up-to-date technology.

But this is the external side of things, so to speak. Let us now discuss the content of Voice of America's broadcasts and the people behind its programs. The radio station is the responsibility of USIA. The head of USIA is a close friend of President Reagan, a very well known and rather odious character called Charles Wick. I have had several conversations with Mr Wick. On these occasions he recalled, almost with pride, that the statutes of Voice of America oblige it to be objective, accurate and balanced in its dissemination of information, which should reflect the views of a wide range of circles in U.S. society.

Does it in fact adhere to these criteria? Hardly. Voice of America is a means for disseminating the views of U.S. ruling circles, the views of the most right-wing, bellicose, anti-Soviet forces in that country, and not just disseminating but foisting them on the rest of the world. You want an example? Here's one. The radio station is currently broadcasting a steady flow of commentaries, rejoinders and selections from the U.S. press that boil down to the argument that if anyone tried to achieve agreement on nuclear armaments at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, it was, of course, the U.S. side. But the Russians, on the other hand, were inflexible and ruined a possible accord. The argument as just as false as it is unoriginal. It was circulated by the administration immediately after Reykjavik. In the Voice of America's program on this subject you will not, of course, hear any recognition of the fact that, in shamelessly pretending that the Soviet proposals are its own and blaming the USSR for the failure of the meeting, the administration is trying to whitewash itself in the eyes of the U.S. public opinion and to earn cheap dividends in advance of the elections.

So, how can you describe this as balanced and objective? How does it reflect the views of U.S. society as a whole? This, after all, is just one viewpoint, the view of the enemies of detente who are not interested in a constructive international dialogue. In other words, the social mandate, which Voice of America implements every day, is largely the social mandate of the United States of monopolies, the military-industrial complex and right-wing politicians.

If you turn to the broadcasts of the Russian department of Voice of America, you see that distortion and misinterpretation of facts, disinformation and blatant slander have long become part of the daily routine. Let us look, for example, at a report on the work of Voice of America, which was published recently by the Helsinki Watch organization. Even this organization, which preaches extreme anti-Sovietism, was forced to admit that many of the programs beamed by the Voice of America to the Soviet Union were chronically alien to the target audience, its values and requirements. The programs, the report says, frequently preach anti-Semitism and extol Nazi criminals. You cannot win over an audience that way, the authors of the document complain.

Complaints are one thing. But what else, may one ask, does the Helsinki Watch expect? After all, the type of person usually recruited by Voice of America is well known. They are convinced enemies of our country, recruited from the ranks of emigres or professional anti-Sovietiers trained by the CIA. Their eyes are blinded by hatred for the USSR. How can this be objectivity?

But since we are talking about freedom of expression and information, I would like to mention the following. The administration frequently complains, with feigned indignation, that the USSR allegedly, creating obstacles to free radio exchange between our two countries. In the process they keep quiet about the fact that in reality they are objectively blocking Soviet broadcasting to the United States. Most radio sets in the United States can only receive medium-wave broadcasts. But we can only broadcast on short-wave because we are so far away. As you know, our leadership recently asked the U.S. Administration to let us start broadcasting either from within the United States itself, or from a region very close to U.S. territory. Although the question is still being studied, the White House puts it, the above-mentioned Charles Wick has answered the question fairly clearly in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST. He declared that the implementation of such an idea was extremely unlikely.

I remember that during our stay at the Voice of America we were guided along the corridor at the radio station, off the Russian, Hungarian and other studios responsible for broadcasting to Eastern Europe located. The atmosphere there left a fairly oppressive imprint on us. The long and narrow corridors reminded us of hospital corridors. People with welcoming faces scurried in and out of the doors. Here's an interesting detail: I do not open the windows in the studios. It seems that air conditioners recirculate old air. One was inevitably reminded of the stale air of the McCarthy era cold war. It is difficult for the fresh winds of change to penetrate the grid blocking on Independence Avenue. [passage omitted]

NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR IN EUROPE AT UN

LD040649 Moscow TASS in English GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 4 -- The Soviet delegation at the 41st U.N. General Assembly voiced its support for an important initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (GDR) and the Democratic Party of Germany (FRG) which favoured a "nuclear-free corridor" in Europe. Soviet representative V.L. Israelyan said at the First Committee General Assembly that the constructive content of this initiative convincingly demonstrated a possibility for achieving concrete understandings on disarmament and that there was a new realistic approach to problems of ensuring security, in spite of differences in political views.

REYKJAVIK TOPICS PLOYS IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Distraction From Economic Woes

LD012248 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; political observer Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Excerpts] Hello, comrades. Washington really is in a fever. Everything that happens nowadays in the U.S. political arena, all statements by party officials, all steps taken by the Republican Administration are done for the effect they will have on the outcome of the vote on 4 November. [passage omitted]

The top echelon of the Republican Party, led by Reagan, attaches particular importance to the forthcoming vote. The loss of their majority in the Senate -- and that certainly cannot be ruled out -- the body that possesses quite a few prerogatives in both domestic and foreign policy, may, according to the prevailing view in Washington, to a considerable extent weaken the President's power and influence during the last 2 years of his stay in the White House. It is also held that losses for the ruling party next week will worsen its chances in the next presidential elections. For that reason, the leaders of the Republican administration have now gone flat out, as they say, to extol their supposed successes, while President Reagan has left the capital and is traveling from state to state, making several speeches a day.

An attempt is being made, first and foremost, to distract Americans from the country's worsened economic situation and, most of all, from what specialists regard as a gloomy economic outlook. [passage omitted]

One further way of scoring political points has now been embarked on by Washington officials -- what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev called the pre-election game that requires success at Reykjavik. Endeavoring to conceal the failure of their domestic and foreign policy, the Republican administration is presenting in a false light the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting, hiding the fact of Washington's unreadiness -- as became apparent -- to take fundamental decisions capable of putting an end to the arms race, and, on the contrary, depicting Reykjavik as a major achievement, based, you see, on U.S. firmness.

One is left with the impression that this sort of campaign is succeeding in misleading some Americans. Since they are entirely deprived of any objective and truthful information, and are worn out by intensive propaganda processing, some of them are inclined to take Washington's interpretation of events seriously. It will be possible to judge next Wednesday, when the results of Tuesday's elections are in, to what extent the campaign to disinform the U.S. public works, if it works at all.

Distortions for Vote Gains

LD020235 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 1 Nov 86

["Moscow Viewpoint" program commentary by political observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] The outcome of the Reykjavik meeting continues to be an issue hotly debated ahead of the midterm elections in the United States. Commentary by political observer of Soviet radio and television Valentin Zorin and here's what he writes: The leaders of the Republican administration are trying hard to cash in on the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting ahead of the midterm elections. During his tour of the country the President tried to convince voters that his administration scored a major foreign

policy victory and that following the Icelandic meeting the Americans have nothing to worry about because the burning international problems are about to be resolved. When the issue is raised of what actually took place at Reykjavik the Republicans unceremoniously distort the facts. Administration officials have become slightly mixed up and issue contradictory statements. The statements of the secretary of state, George Shultz, have been contradicted by Richard Perle. And when the President tried to reconcile their statements he, too, did not stop short of distorting the actual situation.

In his comment on controversial statements coming from Washington Mikhail Gorbachev said that either the American President cannot cope with his associates, who bristle with hatred for the Soviet Union and all that may bring international affairs to a calm course, or he does not want to do that. In any case, said Mikhail Gorbachev, there is no bridling the hawks in the White House and that is very dangerous. The recent U.S. move to order out a group of Soviet diplomats on no grounds whatsoever appears to be linked with the midterm election maneuvering. It looks as though the move was made to calm the hawks and catch the votes on a tough-on-the-Soviets ticket. After Moscow retaliated Washington was embarrassed and it began telling the Americans that, well, all this is nothing but peanuts.

There is another political aspect to these attempts to introduce foreign policy issues to the forefront of the election campaign. The administration is obviously trying to divert public attention away from the economic situation in the country which is far from perfect. According to FORTUNE magazine, the U.S. economy is lethargic and in the opinion of BUSINESS WEEK, the U.S. economy has stalled. By the end of this year America will owe foreign investors a staggering \$250 billion which will make it the world's largest debtor. The federal budget deficit has reached an unprecedented mark and has topped \$200 billion, while the external debt topped 2 trillion. These grim figures are a reminder of the failure of Reaganomics and the consequences of the Reagan administration's foreign policy. The drive for military supremacy jacked up military spending and led the financial, budgetary, and economic system of the United States into disarray. The passive balance of home and foreign policies of the Reagan administration is making it attempt to mislead the electorate in order to catch the votes. [sentence as heard]

Reagan 'Hypocrisy' on DRA

PM031419 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[V. Ovchinnikov "Rejoinder"; "Twin Falls"]

[Text] The U.S. President is currently touring the country, showering his provincial audiences with a waterfall of preelection speeches. Their leitmotiv is the glorification of SDI, which, it is claimed, is needed "as an insurance policy in case the Russians violate existing agreements."

Speaking in Twin Falls, Idaho, the White House incumbent doubled the dose of demagoguery in his river of rhetoric. "The selfsame people who last month announced the 'withdrawal' of troops from Afghanistan are telling us now: 'Trust us' in the sphere of arms control. But they cannot do two mutually exclusive things at the same time. They cannot send in troops one month and announce their withdrawal the next month. They cannot call for the preservation of peace in Reykjavik and wage war in Kabul...."

The President's speech follows a well-known motif: Unless the Soviet Union changes its behavior in the international arena, it cannot be trusted and therefore there is no sense in negotiating with it. The arrangement of the piece may be new, but it is clumsy. [paragraph continues]

How can you be sure that the Russians are withdrawing troops from Afghanistan?, the President asks, repeating Weinberger's fabrication that the units being sent home have been replaced by others. After all, six regiments cannot be concealed like a needle in a haystack. And it would be hard to persuade even backwoods Americans that they can.

In general, does the U.S. Administration have the moral right to link the question of trust with regional conflicts? After all, it was precisely at the time when Reagan was "calling for peace in Reykjavik" that trust in his entourage was thoroughly undermined by the scandal about the disinformation campaign in respect of Libya and the affair over the U.S. aircraft carrying weapons for the "contras" which was downed over Nicaragua.

The White House incumbent would be well-advised not to bring up regional conflicts. Especially as the U.S. ruling circles have a long list of criminal American imperialist adventures ranging from Vietnam to Grenada on their conscience. And the notorious "doctrine of neoglobalism" -- the brainchild of the present administration -- is sowing death by means of U.S. weapons in Nicaragua, Angola, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. The Twin Falls of the President's oratory in Idaho are a mixture of hypocrisy and cynicism.

Reagan 'Propagandizing' SDI

PM031439 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent L. Koryavin report: "The United States: On the Eve of Elections"]

[Excerpt] Washington -- [Passage omitted] The Democrats are paying increased attention in their election campaign to the country's domestic economic situation, which is characterized by a slowdown in production growth, a sharp increase in the budget deficit, and ruin among farmers on a large scale. However, the Democrats are not making a frontal attack but merely conducting rearguard actions. Commentators are pointing out that the "donkey party" has lost many opportunities because it has not established a united election platform and to a great extent has remained divided. As J. Reston observed in THE NEW YORK TIMES, "the Democrats have not achieved unity on either domestic or foreign policy."

The division has also been exploited by Reagan, who has focused attention on propagandizing the U.S. foreign policy course. The U.S. "peace-making" allegedly shown in Reykjavik has begun to be proclaimed from the election platforms. Efforts are being made to convince voters that the Reagan administration and, consequently, the Republican Party are striving for peace and the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Yet the mass electorate is not the main character in the election campaign. It is not the electorate which predetermines the outcome of elections, which "calls the tune," or generously pays the piper -- in hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars. Whichever way you look at it, it is the monopoly associations, primarily those belonging to the military-industrial complex, which play the crucial role. It is to them that the present administration's real position is addressed -- its commitment to "Star Wars," its commitment to a program which the Republicans have made their trump card in the final period of the election campaign. [paragraph continues]

SDI is linked with the chauvinist eulogizing of a "strong America," dulling the consciousness of millions of Americans. SDI is the touchstone of people's "loyalty to America and patriotism."

It is true that recent public opinion polls have shown that potential voters are more interested in the country's economic situation. The U.S. Administration immediately took these feelings into account and in recent speeches in support of Republican candidates -- at a rally in Colorado Springs, for example -- President R. Reagan used the following ploy: propagandizing SDI, he stressed that this military program will give a boost to the new technological process, will create new areas of industry, and will provide Americans with a considerable number of jobs.

The Democrats have been left in a quite difficult position: Either they fall in with Reagan's "Star Wars" concept and get left with the secondary role in the election game, or they resolutely oppose military programs and SDI and run the risk of other consequences -- accusations of inconsistency and lack of principle: After all, everyone remembers that literally a few weeks ago the Democrats in the House of Representatives essentially rubber-stamped a series of the administration's militarist requests. Up to the very last minute the Democrats had not put forward a reasonable alternative to the administration's foreign policy course. To date it has not produced its election theme or put forward its slogan on a nationwide scale.

...The wheel of the election campaign is spinning. The TV screens show the faces of candidates addressing rallies and stopping passers-by in the street, and their names appear on illuminated billboards fixed to institutions and apartment blocks and fastened to taxi roofs. Each one urges: "Vote for me!" Each one promises Americans many things -- which, for the most part, will remain just promises. Thus, on 4 November by no means all Americans will be going to the polls.

SPECIAL SERVICES GET \$25 BILLION; ROLE OUTLINED

PM311055 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Gan: "Unseemly Activity"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Oct 1-- Today President R. Reagan signed a bill, previously approved by Congress, on appropriations for the activity of American special services and U.S. intelligence operations in fiscal 1987. Although the espionage and sabotage departments' budget is secret, information has seeped into the press indicating that it has trebled in recent years and is now \$25 billion.

The President himself eloquently expressed "satisfaction" that the document which, with his signature, has the force of law, "is yet another substantial step forward in efforts to improve the intelligence and counterintelligence potential."

Under the present administration the U.S. special services have begun to play the role of Washington's main military political weapon at home and abroad.

In accordance with existing legislation, the FBI, CIA, Pentagon intelligence, and other departments have basically unlimited powers in the sphere of domestic and foreign espionage, surveillance, and persecution of "unreliable" Americans, and, finally, actual subversive operations abroad, including organizing plots to overthrow governments that are a nuisance to Washington and eliminating foreign politicians. The CIA and the other U.S. special services are kind of "managers" of the policy of U.S. state terrorism and the doctrine of "neoglobalism" -- the doctrine of armed intervention and covert and overt interference in the affairs of sovereign states all over the world.

In Nicaragua, under the direct leadership of the CIA, the "contras" are waging war against the people's government of the Sandinistas. In Afghanistan the dushman gangs are receiving weapons worth around \$500 million per year through the same department. Weapons worth tens of millions of dollars are being delivered to the anti-Angolan terrorist grouping, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and Pol Pot's thugs. In the countries of northeast Africa CIA agents are fostering the local political opposition and inciting it to act against lawful democratic governments. An extensive program to destabilize and overthrow the lawful authorities is being actively implemented vis-a-vis Libya.

FBI 'SPY-MANIA' TRICK USED TO THWART DIALOGUE

PM031115 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Itskov article under the rubric "Secret Services' Secrets": "FBI for Crude Tricks"]

[Text] Each time the U.S. Administration takes another decision to toughen its approach to reaching agreement with the Soviet Union it invariably resorts to the services of its criminal investigation department, the FBI. Need a feisty newspaper ruckus? With pleasure! Want a crude anti-Soviet provocation? Help yourself! Need something else straightaway? No problem! The FBI leaders click their heels obligingly.

The U.S. secret police has its own "in-house tricks" for literally any occasion. Such an occasion occurs when a major anti-Soviet act is in the offing. The plan is by no means complex: A call is made to the Soviet mission in New York, Washington, or San Francisco by a "voluntary spy" who is then sensationally arrested; the "stumblebum" is subsequently tried, there are front-page reports about "Soviet global espionage," and so forth.

In the latest campaign of spy-mania launched in the United States the other day everything proceeded according to the aforesaid plan. A call was made to the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco by a stranger by the name of John Davis (quite a common name in the English-speaking world); the duty officer at the consulate general politely but quite firmly refused to meet with him. However, this time the Pinkertons from the FBI tried out a "new innovation." They sent an FBI cadre staffer Richard (Dayer) to meet with the former serviceman Davis. (Dayer), posing as a "Soviet worker," tried to discover the totally unsuspecting unemployed Davis' "secret information" and provoke him into supporting "further secret contacts."

Alas, there is now no chance of reconstructing the details of the dialogue between these two Americans, the provocateur and his victim. [paragraph continues]

But one thing is clear: The latest spy show in the United States was specially played out immediately after Reykjavik, when there was quite obvious hope of continuing the useful dialogue between the USSR and the United States. That was when the services of the U.S. secret police were needed once again. And those U.S. observers who claim not without justification that the FBI always has time for crude tricks are right....

GORBACHEV 'IN FAVOR' OF SUMMIT MEETING WITH U.S.

For the message from CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe regarding the Harare nonaligned summit, in which Gorbachev comments on a future summit with the United States, see the Sub-Saharan Africa section of this DAILY REPORT, page J 2.

'FINAL COLONIZATION' OF PACIFIC ISLANDS DECREED

LD041012 Moscow TASS in English 0859 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 4 TASS -- President Reagan on Monday signed a proclamation announcing the Marshall and Marianas Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia as states freely associated with the United States.

Under a United Nations decision, the territories were placed under U.S. trusteeship in 1947.

The White House statement means the final colonization of the islands. Under the pretext of ensuring their defence, the administration is using the insular territories for its own militarist purposes and mounting its military presence in the Pacific region.

PROGRAM OF EXCHANGES SIGNED WITH CANADA

LD301627 Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Ottawa October 30 TASS -- The negotiations between Soviet and Canadian delegations ended in Ottawa in line with an understanding reached during the official visit to Canada by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, on holding negotiations to agree on a programme for bilateral exchanges in science, education and culture for the coming two years.

Today the sides signed a concerted programme of exchanges and cooperation in science, education and culture between the USSR and Canada for 1987-1988.

The document provides for expanding the bilateral exchange and cooperation in such spheres as natural sciences and humanities, education, medicine, histrionic, musical and pictorial arts, literature, cinema, television, radio, tourism and book publishing.

The programme for exchanges was signed by Ambassador V.N. Sofinskiy, head of the Soviet delegation and first deputy head of the Department on Humanitarian and Cultural Relations of the USSR Foreign Ministry, and by A. Maclane, head of the Department of the USSR and East European Countries.

PRAVDA NOTES WPK POLITBURO DISCUSSES MOSCOW TALKS

PMO31122 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "WPK Central Committee Politburo Session"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 31 Oct -- The Workers Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee Politburo assesses highly and approves unanimously the results of the Moscow meetings and talks between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Kim Il-song, general secretary of the WPK Central Committee and president of the DPRK, a report published here on a session of the WPK Central Committee Politburo says.

The session noted the special significance of the DPRK leader's friendly visit for the further all-around widening and development of friendly relations between the USSR and the DPRK. The visit, the report says, made a great contribution to the strengthening on the socialist countries' cohesion and the development of the international communist movement. The friendly relations between the USSR and the DPRK are indissoluble, allied relations of selfless cooperation between class brothers and comrades in the revolutionary struggle. They are based on the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK.

In the course of his visit Kim Il-song expressed full support for the proposals of the CPSU and the Soviet Government -- proposals dictated by a lofty sense of responsibility for the cause of peace throughout the world -- on banning nuclear tests, preventing the militarization of space, and totally eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century and on turning the Asian-Pacific region into a zone of peace and cooperation free from nuclear weapons, and assessed highly the USSR's position at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, which demonstrated the immutability of the USSR's peace-loving Leninist policy.

The Soviet side declared full support for the DPRK's active, constructive initiatives to eliminate tension on the Korean peninsula and promote the peaceful settlement of the question of the reunification of Korea and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, as well as the demand for the withdrawal from South Korea of American troops and arms, including nuclear arms, which are the main obstacle to the country's unification. The Politburo stressed that the strengthening and development of Soviet-Korean friendship, which grew up in the course of many years of struggle for the Marxist-Leninist cause, is the unswerving course of the WPK and the DPRK Government and the unanimous will of the Korean people.

The WPK Central Committee Politburo expressed determination to continue to march shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Soviet people in the joint struggle against imperialism and for the triumph of the cause of peace, socialism, and communism and to raise the relations of friendship and cooperation between the CPSU and the WPK and between the USSR and the DPRK to a higher level, and adopted a corresponding resolution on this question, the report says.

REBUTTAL OF ASDF OFFICIAL'S REMARK ON ALLIANCE

OW030027 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Kalinin commentary]

[Text] According to a KYODO report, Air Force General Mori, Chairman of the Joint Council of Staff of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces [SDF], recently said that Japan has no plans to form a U.S.-Japan-South Korea military alliance. Radio Moscow commentator Kalinin comments as follows:

Mori, chairman of the joint Council of Staff, made the remark in Eniwa City, Hokkaido, where the SDF maintains a large training area. It can be said that he could not have selected a worse place to make the remark. In Eniwa, Japan-U.S. joint military maneuvers, the first of their kind, are currently under way, with approximately 13,000 Japanese and U.S. troops taking part. Also participating are U.S. military aircraft from South Korea. General Mori denied the move for a tripartite alliance despite the indisputable facts which he must know. He himself recently met with the South Korean Navy's chief of operations. Bilateral trade or political discussions are normally carried out between business or political representatives; when military leaders of any two countries meet, they obviously discuss military cooperation. Incidentally, the current Japan-U.S. military maneuvers are being held in parallel with U.S.-South Korean joint naval exercises. The coincidence is by no means accidental.

The above is only a recent example. A number of other factors also point to the deepening of U.S.-Japan-South Korea military cooperation. Among them are exchanges of espionage information, adoption of a unified code system for the three nations' air forces, military transportation to South Korea provided by Japan, sending of South Korean officers for study to the Japanese Defense College, and participation of Japanese observers in the U.S.-South Korean exercise Team Spirit. In denying the move for a tripartite alliance, General Mori cited the Constitution prohibiting Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense. Speaking of the Constitution, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution bans preparations of any type for war; nevertheless, the Japanese ruling circles built armed forces and have imposed on them duties of blockading international straits and defense of 1,000 miles of sealanes. Therefore, General Mori's reference to the Constitution did not necessarily help make his argument more convincing. In view of the preceding facts, it made it even less convincing.

When viewed objectively, these facts indicate that the United States, Japan, and South Korea are becoming increasingly close in their military relations. Their goal is to form a triangular military bloc in the Far East in the practical sense of the word. Moreover, for the Soviet Union and other countries in the region, the fact that such a bloc really exists is more important than whether or not the bloc is complete in all legal details.

Then, why is the Soviet Union opposed to forming military blocs, not only in the Far East but in any other part of the world? It is not just because such blocs, forged under the auspices of the United States, are spearheaded against the Soviet Union. The primary reason is that, if nations join forces in opposing blocs, it would result in alienating countries, spawning distrust and antagonism, aggravating confrontation, and escalating regional conflicts. All these things fan military tension and enhance the risk of conflict. That is exactly why the Soviet Union is concerned about the move for a Far East version of NATO.

PRAVDA ON GORBACHEV TALKS WITH INDIAN MINISTER

PM041007 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 86 First Edition p 1

["M.S. Gorbachev Receives N.D. Tiwari" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] On 3 November, Mikhail Gorbachev received in the Kremlin India's External Affairs Minister Narayan Dutt Tiwari, congratulated him on his appointment to the post and expressed confidence that his colleagues and he would carry on the cause of cooperation, mutual understanding, trust, and friendship in relations between the two countries and that everything built in that field over the decades would be preserved and replenished.

Even more importance is attached in the international situation after the Reykjavik meeting to the independent course pursued by the Indian leadership, the high level and meaningful contents of Soviet-Indian relations, the dynamism and fruitfulness of political dialogue and mutual support, socioeconomic contacts on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology, and broad cultural exchanges. All this benefits the interests of not only the two great peoples but the world community as a whole both as an example of peaceful coexistence and as a factor of ending the arms race, achieving world security, and ensuring equality for all the states and their progress.

Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed anew that relations with India are for the Soviet Union a matter of principle and that they have a great value in themselves and are not subject to any fluctuations of external influences. The Soviet leadership will not take a single step in its international policy that could prejudice India's real interests. Special attention was attached to prospects for bilateral economic, scientific, and technological contacts with the use of new forms and possibilities and with due regard for the overall world economic situation. Problems of relations with some third countries were discussed. Narayan Dutt Tiwari outlined the activities of the Nonaligned Movement, whose role is highly appreciated by the Soviet Union.

Other participants in the conversation were Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR; India's ambassador Triloki Nath Kaul; A.P. Venkateshwaran, external affairs secretary to the minister for external affairs of India; and G.K. Arora, secretary to the Indian Prime Minister.

Kamentsev Receives Minister

LD040003 Moscow TASS in English 2302 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS -- Vladimir Kamentsev, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, today received Indian Foreign Minister Narayan Dutt Tiwari. They talked about the continued development of trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and India and the activities of the Soviet-Indian intergovernmental Commission for Cooperation in Economic, Scientific and Technological Fields.

Also today Narayan Dutt Tiwari had a conversation with Konstantin Katushev, chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for External Economic Relations, to discuss the state of, and prospects for further developing, Soviet-Indian economic and technological cooperation. Narayan Dutt Tiwari left the Soviet Union tonight.

KAMENTSEV RECEIVES HUNGARIAN COUNTERPART MARJAI

PM040845 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 86 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversation Held"]

[Text] A conversation took place 28 October between V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and J. Marjai, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers. Questions of Soviet-Hungarian trade and economic cooperation were examined.

Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR S. Rajnai took part in the conversation, which proceeded in a warm friendly atmosphere.

GROMYKO PRESENTS AWARD TO BULGARIAN ENVOY

PM031247 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Order Presented to Bulgarian Ambassador, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps"]

[Text] A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, presented a high Soviet state award in the Kremlin 31 October to Dimitur Zhulev, dean of the diplomatic corps and Bulgarian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR. He was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Star for his active work to strengthen fraternal friendship and all-around cooperation between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

There is every justification today, A.A. Gromyko said in presenting the award, to express great satisfaction that Comrade Zhulev has coped well with his tasks as ambassador. That is how we in Moscow view the situation. As far as we are aware, your work is also assessed highly in Bulgaria. Soviet people believe that the relations between our countries are truly fraternal and warm. The work to develop and deepen those relations is not stopping for a single day.

I would particularly like to underline the importance of the meetings between Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Comrade Todor Zhivkov. These meetings have been devoted, as a rule, to major questions of bilateral relations and international policy, and their results have always been fruitful for both countries.

In reply D. Zhulev expressed sincere gratitude to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government for their high assessment of his activities.

GORBACHEV RECEIVES GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER

LD032233 Moscow TASS in English 2132 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS -- A meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece Kharilaos Florakis was held at the CPSU Central Committee today.

Mikhail Gorbachev greeted Kharilaos Florakis and his associates -- representatives of the party with a heroic past, true friends and comrades-in-arms who have been invariably forging ahead shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for common ideals in any political weather.

Fraternal relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Greece are deeply rooted in the traditions of both peoples, rest on ideological unity, on the community of views on world development. For the Hellenic people, for Greece, for the world communist movement the Communist Party of Greece is an influential national force, patriotic and international force which earned prestige by its selfless struggle for the interests of its people, by high responsibility for the present and future of its country.

The sides confirmed complete mutual understanding and community of stands on all the complex problems of the present-day international relations: On the Reykjavik results, against nuclear menace, for international and European security, for normalization of the situation in the Mediterranean, for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, for an equitable solution of the Cyprus issue, on the state of the world economy and crisis phenomena in it, against the imperial policy of neo-globalism and so on.

The interlocutors expressed understanding for the policy conducted by the Greek PASOK government in matters of nuclear disarmament, European detente, on other problems, for its striving to uphold an independent course suiting Greece's national interests, commended its efforts in the framework of the "Delhi Six".

Mikhail Gorbachev thoroughly analyzed a deep-going reorganization that has been started in Soviet society, outlined what has already been achieved on this road, summed up the decisions taken, the decisions aimed at renewal of all aspects of society on a socialist basis, pointed to difficulties and the experience already accumulated in this revolutionary undertaking. The participants in the conversation duly assessed the strategy of imperialism which fearing that socialism will bring into play its entire huge potential, fearing international consequences of this process try in every way to hamper and frustrate it.

On behalf of his party, Kharilaos Florakis spoke highly of the worldwide historic importance of the activity of the CPSU to implement the ideas and decisions of the April plenary meeting, of the 27th CPCU Congress. On his part he thoroughly analyzed the situation in Greece, the possibilities and prospects of the communists' struggle for the interests of the working people, for national interests of Greece, their effort to enhance Greece's international prestige.

The sides discussed the question of the role and responsibility of the international communist movement for the state and future of the world of today, the possibilities of rallying closer the international communist movement through direct comradely exchange of opinions among equal and independent fraternal parties.

Mikhail Gorbachev asked Kharilaos Florakis to convey to the Greek people profound sympathies of the Soviet people, wished success to the Greek communists. Kharilaos Florakis expressed the conviction that the CPSU will achieve the goals set and made assurances of the invariable support of the Greek Communists for the difficult work of the CPSU that is so important to entire humanity.

Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Nikolaos Kaioudis, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece, Orestio Kolozof, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece took part in the meeting.

DOBRYNIN, ZAGLADIN MEET SPANISH COMMUNISTS

PMO31445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

["Meeting at the CPSU Central Committee" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A meeting of the delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Spain was held at the CPSU Central Committee 1 November.

From the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it was attended by secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin and member of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's international department Vadim Zagladin.

From the Communist Party of Spain the meeting was attended by general secretary of the party Ignacio Gallego, members of the executive committee and the secretariat of the party central committee Fidel Alonso, Jaime Ballesteros, Jose Serradel, member of the executive committee and secretariat of the party Central Committee, General Secretary of the Party of Communists of Catalonia Juan Ramos.

Representatives of the CPSU told the Spanish side that the party and all the Soviet people are working to bring into life the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, aimed at accelerating the socio economic development of the country, at perfecting Soviet society.

In discussing the present-day international situation, the CPSU delegation informed the Spanish comrades of the results of the Soviet-American Reykjavik meeting, the content and the significance of the large-scale constructive proposals, which were put forward at the meeting by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Spain highly appreciated the initiative policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the international scene, the Soviet proposals which were made at the meeting in Iceland. The delegation of the Communist Party of Spain noted that the antiwar movement was gaining momentum in Spain, and that the awareness of the importance of the preservation of the country's nonnuclear status was growing.

In these conditions favorable prospects are opening up for more vigorous, energetic actions of the broad political and public forces in Europe in order to avert a nuclear catastrophe and to fully eliminate nuclear weapons, both parties believe.

The delegation of the Communist Party of Spain dwelt on its activities aimed at defending the fundamental interests of the working people, its participation jointly with other progressive forces in the struggle for an independent, peaceful policy of the country. The CPSU delegation pledged the Soviet communists' solidarity with the Communist Party of Spain and wished it successes in the struggle for peace and social progress.

The representatives of the two parties underlined the mutual striving to promote the development of the relations of mutually beneficial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Spain and friendly contacts between the peoples of the two countries.

The delegatin of the Communist Party of Spain informed the Soviet side of its efforts aimed at attaining unity of all Spanish communists on a principled basis, at developing relations with other fraternal parties in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist internationalist solidarity. The CPSU delegation reaffirmed the striving of the party of Lenin to promote in every way the communists' greater contribution to the struggle for peace and social progress, to develop the relations with all fraternal parties on the basis of the principles formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The meeting passed in an atmosphere of comradely friendship.

TOLKUNOV MEETS FINNISH MINISTER IN HELSINKI

LD032116 Moscow TASS in English 2043 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Helsinki November 3 TASS -- A meeting between Paavo Vayrynen, chairman of the Centre Party, Finnish minister of foreign affairs, and Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took place here today.

Lev Tolkunov is currently in Finland at the head of a Soviet delegation attending the third European conference of the centrist, liberal and agrarian parties on security and cooperation.

During the meeting Paavo Vayrynen pointed out the development of the process started by the conference on security and cooperation in Europe as well as the role being played in it by the parties which are taking part in the current conference.

Lev Tolkunov emphasized the importance of the unity of all public forces in the striving for nuclear disarmament and for peaceful cooperation in the European continent.

During the meeting, there was also an exchange of views on some matters of Soviet-Finnish relations.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA ON KUWAITI PLANE LANDING

PMO31120 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Nov 86 First Edition p 6

[N. Dombkovskiy report under the rubric "We Report the Details": "A Boeing-727 Requests Permission To Land"]

[Text] On Wednesday 29 October, a Boeing-727 plane belonging to Air Kuwait was carrying out flight number 053 on the Damascus to Tehran route. The war between Iran and Iraq, which has been going on for some years now, has left its mark on civil aviation activity too -- airliners have to make a long detour to avoid the conflict region, burning up a great deal of fuel en route.

The Kuwaiti crew made a turn over Ankara and commenced the flight toward Tehran. It was here that something unpleasant lay in store. The point is that the approach to land at that city's airport is very difficult. Even the most experienced pilots are given permission to land only when horizontal visibility is 6-7 km. The haze which can form in an instant, as if from nowhere, or the dust storms which drift in unexpectedly can make it impossible for an airliner to fly between the high mountains which encircle Tehran.

The Boeing-727 had already begun its descent when meteorological conditions in the Iranian capital deteriorated completely. The crew could not turn back now: They were running out of fuel. The only possible way out of the situation was to land at Yerevan -- there was absolutely no way of reaching any other airport.

The commander of the Kuwaiti plane contacted Soviet officials over the radio and requested permission to make a forced landing.

It must be noted that all those involved in air traffic control over our country's territory and the protection of the USSR's state border did everything possible to help the people in trouble.

At 1607 hours, minutes after the appeal for help, the airliner received permission to cross the border and pass over the USSR's territory. At 1611 the Boeing entered our airspace in the region of Dzhusfa, and 26 minutes later it made a successful landing in Yerevan.

During that half hour, and especially in the last tense minutes, excellent work was done by the air traffic controllers, headed by flight controller 26-year-old Komsomol member Armen Gevondyan.

As SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reported yesterday, the Kuwaiti Government has expressed profound gratitude to the government of the Soviet Union for the Soviet side's attentiveness to the passengers and crew of the aircraft.

The plane underwent servicing and was refueled, and the next morning, at 0809 hours, the Boeing-727 left hospitable Yerevan.

GORBACHEV MEETS WITH OLIVER TAMBO 4 NOV

LD041217 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] A meeting took place today between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa, the ANC, who arrived in the USSR at the head of the ANC delegation.

Welcoming the ANC president, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed solidarity with the courageous struggle of the South African patriots against the inhuman system of apartheid, and said that in the Soviet Union, the ANC is viewed as expressing the genuine interests of the people of South Africa, and as the recognized leader of the national liberation movement in that country.

The ANC president sincerely thanked the CPSU and the Soviet people for their unvarying support for the struggling people of South Africa. He told of the situation in the RSA, which is typified by a profound crisis for the apartheid regime. Noting the unprecedented scale of mass antiracist manifestations, he stressed that the patriotic forces of South Africa headed by the ANC set themselves the aim of creating a united democratic state where there will be no room for racism and where equal rights will be guaranteed for all citizens, regardless of the color of their skin.

The CPSU general secretary stated that such a position meets with total understanding in the Soviet Union.

Tambo welcomed the USSR's efforts which aim to radically improve the international situation, and gave a high appraisal of the Soviet leadership's responsible and principled stand at the meeting in Reykjavik.

The CPSU and ANC leaders expressed their common opinion that a just political settlement in southern Africa could be achieved. What is needed for this is to put an end to the aggressive actions of Pretoria against independent African states, to ensure the granting of independence to Namibia in accordance with the well-known UN resolutions, and to remove the system of apartheid from South Africa, the primary cause of the conflict situation in the region. They called on everyone who is interested in a peaceful and free future for the peoples of southern Africa to make their contribution to the joint search for a way to solve these tasks.

The participants in the meeting confirmed their solidarity with the frontline African states and the Southwest African People's Organization, and condemned the so-called "constructive engagement" of the U.S. Administration and with the South African racists and its interference in the internal affairs of Angola through its support for the puppet bands of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. With a sense of deep sorrow, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Tambo paid tribute to the bright memory of Samora Machel, the prominent figure in the national liberation movement, chairman of the Mozambique Liberation Front party, and president of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Concluding the talks, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev asked Tambo to pass on greetings and a sense of solidarity to Mandela and other political prisoners languishing in racist jails. He wished the ANC new successes in its just struggle.

MUGABE RECEIVES GORBACHEV 'HARARE APPEAL' REPLY

LD032141 Moscow TASS in English 2036 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Harare November 3 TASS -- An official ceremony to deliver the reply given by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the message from the eighth non-aligned summit conference, to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, took place here today.

Speaking at the ceremony, Robert Mugabe expressed gratitude to Mikhail Gorbachev for such a prompt reply, which is indicative of the great importance which the Soviet leadership attaches to the Non-Aligned Movement.

"The participants in the eighth non-aligned summit conference", he said, "devoted special attention to matters aimed at keeping peace and strengthening international security. The discussion resulted in a unanimously adopted 'Harare Appeal' to the leaders of the USSR and the USA".

Robert Mugabe said that he would immediately forward Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to all the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries.

"We hope", he emphasized, "that we shall be also able to deliver the 'Harare Appeal' to United States President Ronald Reagan soon".

Mikhail Gorbachev's reply was handed over to Robert Mugabe by Georgiy Ter-Gazaryants, the ambassador of the USSR to the Republic of Zimbabwe.

GORBACHEV IN MESSAGE TO MUGABE FAVORS U.S. SUMMIT

PM041139 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Nov 86 Second Edition p 1

["Reply to the 'Harare Appeal' by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Robert Gabriel Mugabe, chairman of the Nonaligned Movement and prime minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Mugabe,

I have attentively studied the Harare Appeal handed to me on 8 October 1986 by your special envoy Mangwende, the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

The well-founded concern regarding the nuclear arms race, the understanding of the urgent need for immediate actions to save civilization are expressed in this document. We deeply understand this serious concern of heads of states and governments of countries, members of the Nonaligned Movement which represent a great part of the world's population. We highly value the position of the Eighth Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Nonaligned Countries in Harare on issues connected with the nuclear danger as well as the Nonaligned Movement's unique contribution to international development. We are convinced that this contribution will continue to grow steadily.

As you well know, the Soviet Union, in harmony with its principled foreign political course and the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress, has recently unilaterally, and jointly with its allies, put forward a whole complex of peaceloving initiatives, practically embracing all aspects of the disarmament problem. The development of world events and above all the dangerous consequences of the U.S. Administration's policy have made it necessary -- and this was reflected at the Harare conference where leaders of almost 100 nonaligned states gathered -- to show political will and to adopt decisive actions to bridle the nuclear arms race. Understanding its responsibility for the world's fate and international security, the Soviet leadership decided to hold an immediate meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Such a meeting, held on our initiative, took place in Reykjavik. The USSR's position is honest, brave, and open, providing solutions on cardinal questions of reducing and liquidating nuclear armaments, is based on the principles of equality and equal security, taking both sides and their allies' interests into account. At the same time -- and I would like to stress this -- it is in harmony with the interests of all countries and peoples. Thus, the platform we put forward in Reykjavik has met with understanding in many countries throughout the world, including nonaligned countries, and in most varied political and public circles. We believe that in our platform -- in the interlinked proposals, carefully balanced from the point of view of interests of the participants in the talks themselves, and of the whole community of states -- a new approach, new thinking, the necessity of which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age, was specifically expressed.

My speeches on the results of the meeting in Reykjavik and also the special representatives which we sent to a number of countries have provided detailed and objective information and our evaluation of the meeting which took place. This relieves me from the necessity of dealing once more with the detailed account of the Soviet and U.S. positions at those talks. I will only recall that the compromise proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik brought about a real possibility of reaching agreement on some of the most important questions facing mankind, including liquidating nuclear arms, banning nuclear tests, and not permitting weapons to enter space. The agreement that was almost reached on the major issues of world policy could not, unfortunately, be embodied in a binding accord between the sides because of the U.S.' stubborn striving to work toward the implementation of the militarist SDI program and thus to launch a race in new types of arms. With regard to the Soviet Union, it counters the Star Wars plans with a constructive alternative: specifically, establishing large scale cooperation in the peaceful study and development of space. The United States did not even show readiness to conduct talks on the question of halting and barring nuclear tests, which also caused concern at the nonaligned summit conference. I have had to say more than once that the attitude toward this question has become the most convincing indicator today of how seriously each of the large nuclear powers is concerned with disarmament, international security, and generally with the matter of peace. The U.S.' rejection to join in the moratorium is something we are not alone in seeing, with full justification, as a striving to achieve military superiority, to continue the arms race, to spread it to new spheres, in particular to space.

Regarding the question touched upon in the Harare Appeal on a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, we, as before, are in favor of such a meeting but with the absolute understanding that it must bring results and take into account the objective fact that Reykjavik has created a qualitatively new international situation, that the problem of nuclear disarmament has been put forward to a new higher level and that movement back from it is unacceptable and inadmissible.

We have given due attention to the statement of the participants in the Harare conference on the readiness to continue to play an active role in finding solutions to tasks ensuring international peace and security. I would like to assure you, Comrade Chairman, that the Soviet Union is determined, for its part, to continue to cooperate actively and to work together with nonaligned countries -- an authoritative and progressive contemporary force -- in solving those urgent problems which mankind faces today. We believe that we must do everything possible so that the chance which has appeared for solving the problems of war and peace in the interests of mankind is not missed.

With sincere respect
M. Gorbachev

ZIMBABWE'S MUZENDA, DELEGATION ARRIVE IN MOSCOW

Muzenda Received by Dobrynin

LD032223 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] There was a meeting today between Comrade Dobrynin and Muzenda, vice president and second secretary of ZANU-PF, deputy prime minister of Zimbabwe. He has arrived in the USSR heading a government delegation. Muzenda conveyed a personal message from Robert Mugabe, president and first secretary of ZANU-PF and prime minister of Zimbabwe, addressed to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. There was a friendly conversation between Comrades Dobrynin and Muzenda on Soviet-Zimbabwean cooperation, and several problems of the international situation. The striving of both sides for further development of relations between the two parties was expressed.

Kamentsev Receives Muzenda

LD032303 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1902 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov (TASS) -- Today Vladimir Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers received Simon Muzenda, deputy prime minister of Zimbabwe, and had a conversation with him on the state of Soviet-Zimbabwean trade and economic cooperation, and the prospects for its development.

COMMENTARY NOTES VARIOUS REPORTS ON MACHEL DEATH

MB312025 Moscow in Afrikaans to South Africa 1800 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary]

[Text] The tragic death of President Samora Machel of Mozambique in a plane crash in South Africa on 19 October still dominates the world news. New facts and positions have emerged. Here is a commentary by Aleksandr Fedorov concerning this subject.

The famous backwater of South Africa, Nkomati, is in the news again following the emergence of reports that strongly differ from the account given by the South African authorities concerning the circumstances of the accident that killed President Machel and his entourage on 19 October. The weather was calm. There were no storms. The South African police arrived at the scene of the accident. They started searching for the diplomatic bags and other privileged information rather than giving first aid to the wounded. The first attempts at rendering medical assistance only came about after 8 hours after the accident.

One of the news agencies in Johannesburg reports that it has information that President Machel's plane was led off course by a movable decoy set up by the South African Defense Force for the purpose of diverting President Machel's plane to its fateful end.

These facts have awakened the world's interest because the information given by the South African authorities does not agree with the other accounts of person who were at the scene of the crash. The South African-supplied information reeks of untruth. The behavior of the South African racist toward President Machel was fully expressed by General Magnus Malan's remarks that were published in several newspapers on the day of the crash -- 19 October. Malan's remarks were full of hate and vengeance toward the Mozambican president. Even death threats were directed at him.

Now the racist regime says the doubts about the truthfulness of their account are objectionable. However, one thing should be pointed out: The racist regime is characterized by terrorism and banditry. Otherwise, why does it oppress millions of people in their native land? Why does it keep in detention all those people opposed to apartheid and racism? The South African Government gets its strongest support from the United States. For instance, the bandits in Angola and in Mozambique are furnished with weapons obtained from the United States.

Some world sources suspect that the president's plane was brought down by the bandits of the MNR. If this is the case, it would have only been possible to accomplish such a feat with South African-supplied equipment. That is why South Africa is wholly answerable for this action. South Africa cannot deceive the world. The people inside South Africa itself are aware of the facts concerning the tragedy of 19 October.

Such happenings will definitely unite international opinion against the Pretoria regime; and southern Africa will be headed for a more violent phase than before.

BRIEFS

ANGOLAN RADIO-TV -- Luanda, 30 Oct (TASS)-- Protocols on cooperation between the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the National Radio and Television of Angola for 1987-88 have been signed here. They will broaden the exchange of radio and television programs about the political, social and economic, cultural, and sports life of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola. The USSR will give assistance to the Angolan television in the preparation of qualified national cadres. In line with a protocol, the USSR will send to Angola a group of creative workers to shoot a television film about Angolan achievements during the years of independence. Angolan television will take part in the international festival of television programs on folkarts which will take place in Moscow in 1987. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1438 GMT 30 Oct LD]

MOLDAVIAN SSR EXCLUDED FROM DOCUMENTS, AWARDS

LD031656 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee have recognized the necessity of excluding the Moldavian SSR from the number of republics awarded with honorary documents of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee and with financial prizes for results in All-Union socialist competition for successfully implementing the wintering over of cattle and increasing production and purchases of livestock produce in the winter of 1985-1986, in connection with facts that have emerged showing overreporting in accounts for livestock breeding.

MODEL 'STATUTE' FOR NEW COOPERATIVES PUBLISHED

PM031627 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 43, Oct 86 (Signed to Press 16 Oct 86) pp 15, 16

["Model Statute for Cooperatives for the Procurement and Processing of Secondary Raw Materials under USSR Gosnab Territorial Organs" -- EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA headline under rubric: "New Official Materials"; first two paragraphs are EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Proceeding from the 27th CPSU Congress directives, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo examined and approved in August 1986 the fundamental principles for the development of cooperative forms of production at the present stage of the country's socioeconomic development. A government proposal on measures for the setting up of cooperatives for the procurement and processing of secondary raw materials in several union republics was approved.

The USSR Council of Ministers recently approved a model statute [ustav] for cooperatives for the procurement and processing of secondary raw materials, whose text is published below.

I. Objectives and Tasks of the Cooperative for the Procurement and Processing of Secondary Raw Materials [subhead]

1. The cooperative is an organization of USSR citizens in voluntary combination on the basis of collective labor and self-management with the objective of joint performance of work involving the procurement, processing, and supply of secondary raw materials and output manufactured from them.

The cooperative is set up under USSR Gosnab territorial organs at the request of not fewer than 5 and not more than 50 citizens expressing the desire to pool their labor in its activity.

2. The cooperative's basic tasks are:

To organize the procurement, processing, and sale of secondary raw materials, primarily those originating among the population, and thus to improve the utilization of material resources and the services for the population;
Using secondary raw materials, to produce consumer goods including various commodities for cultural, consumer service, and domestic use, as well as output for production and industrial purposes;

To involve additional labor resources in social production through the participation of pensioners, housewives, students and school pupils in their free time from study, and other categories of the population not engaged in social production in the procurement and processing of secondary raw materials.

II. Membership in the Cooperative, Rights and Obligations of Members of the Cooperative [subhead]

3. Membership in the cooperative is open to USSR citizens over the age of 18 years and capable of participating through their personal labor in the performance of tasks assigned to the cooperative. Basically, the cooperative recruits members of the population not engaged in social production: pensioners, housewives, students in higher and secondary education establishments in their free time from study, and -- in individual cases -- workers in state enterprises, organizations, and institutions, in their free time from their main work. Workers and employees may be admitted to the cooperative under labor agreements in cases when relevant specialists are lacking in the cooperative or when any works scheduled under plans or contracts cannot be performed by the members of the cooperative alone within the set time. Moreover, members of the cooperative and persons working in the cooperative under labor agreements retain their full entitlement to pension rights or study grants.

Admission to membership of the cooperative is effected by the cooperative's general meeting in the presence of the applicants.

4. Members of the cooperative are obliged:

To work conscientiously, to observe labor discipline, and to master advanced work methods and practices;

To observe the cooperative's Statute and internal Regulations and to fulfill decisions made by the cooperative's general meeting or board;

To participate actively in the management of the cooperative's affairs, to safeguard and consolidate state and cooperative property, and to prevent economic mismanagement and negligence toward social assets.

5. Members of the cooperative are entitled:

To obtain work as part of the cooperative's economic activity, taking into account the cooperative's potential;

To receive a share of any revenues due to be distributed among members of the cooperative according to the quantity and quality of labor invested by them;

To participate in the management of the cooperative's affairs, to submit proposals for the improvement of its activity or the elimination of shortcomings in the work of its organs and officials, and to elect the cooperative's leading and monitoring organs.

6. A labor book will be maintained for every member of the cooperative, except in cases in which the main occupation of a member of the cooperative is with a state, social, or other cooperative organization (enterprise). Members of the cooperative may belong to a trade union, enjoying all the rights and performing all the obligations of a trade union member.

7. Application by any member of the cooperative to withdraw from the cooperative must be examined by a general meeting of the members of the cooperative within 1 month.

A member of the cooperative is deemed to have withdrawn from the cooperative from the moment the relevant decision has been made by the general meeting.

Final settlement with a former member of the cooperative is completed within 2 days of his withdrawal from the cooperative on the basis of the volume of work actually performed by him and the time he has worked, according to the rates set by the cooperative.

Following the end of the financial year, and no later than 1 month after the annual accounts have been approved, a former member of the cooperative is allocated his due share of the cooperative's revenues being distributed according to the financial year's results.

The same procedure is applied in the case of settlement with any member of the cooperative who either has willfully abandoned production or has been expelled from membership of the cooperative for flagrant violations of labor discipline or set rules, except that there is no payment of any share of the cooperative's revenues being distributed according to the financial year's results.

III. The Cooperative's Production and Economic Activity [subhead]

8. The cooperative engages in activity using its own resources under contracts to organize the procurement, processing, and delivery of secondary raw materials and output manufactured from them.

9. The cooperative concludes such contracts with production-procurement organizations and enterprises within the USSR Gosstab system. The cooperative may also conclude contracts with other organizations and enterprises generating, procuring, or utilizing secondary raw materials or output manufactured from them.

The contracts regulate the reciprocal obligations of the cooperative and the enterprise (organization) as regards the volume of and timetable for the procurement, processing, and delivery of secondary raw materials and resultant output, their quality and prices, and obligations to create conditions necessary for the performance of work under the contract by the cooperative.

The contract can be concluded for periods of up to 5 years but of not less than 1 year.

10. The cooperatives independently elaborate and approve plans for the cooperative's [as published] development on the basis of contracts concluded. The cooperatives notify their basic plan indicators to local planning and financial organs and USSR Gosstab territorial organs within the time limit set for plan elaboration.

11. In order to perform the tasks facing it, the cooperative: sets up stations for the procurement and processing of secondary raw materials according to established procedures -- it acquires secondary raw materials primarily from the population and from small compact sources among state, social, and cooperative enterprises and organizations at current prices or, when there are no set current prices, at prices set by agreement; utilizes private motor vehicle transport and tools belonging to members of the cooperative, subject to appropriate reimbursement to the owner of any expenses incurred in using them; obtains, according to established procedures, the use of the necessary equipment and machinery and acquires material and articles, special clothing, tools, and auxiliary materials for carrying out the cooperative's economic activity; obtains monetary advances from enterprises (organizations) with which it maintains contractual relations in respect of expenditure connected with the performance of tasks facing it; enters into contractual relations with state and cooperative organizations, and also performs other activities related to the objectives of its activity and tasks under the statute.

12. The cooperative is a legal person with its own independent budget, and it has a seal bearing its name.

The cooperative keeps its monetary funds in current and other accounts with USSR Gosbank or savings bank institutions, and conducts all cash and check transactions according to established rules.

The deposit or withdrawal of monetary funds from the cooperative's accounts is authorized by the cooperative's chairman or his deputy and the cooperative's chief (senior) bookkeeper.

13. The cooperative maintains bookkeeping and statistical accounts and, under a fixed procedure, compiles and submits accounts to the appropriate organs for all types of production and economic activity by the cooperative in established forms and within set times, being responsible for the veracity of such accounts.

14. The state bears no responsibility for any loss-making operations by the cooperative. Any cooperative lacking the resources to implement its activities on the principles of self-capitalization and self-financing is subject to dissolution.

IV. Formation and Utilization of the Cooperative's Funds [subhead]

15. The cooperative's funds are formed from amounts received in payment for secondary raw materials or output manufactured from them supplied to consumers.

16. The cooperative's revenues from the procurement and sales of secondary raw materials or output manufactured from them are utilized for the reimbursement of expenditure on materials and the payment of income tax and other mandatory deductions. Moreover, cooperatives make payments for the use of electricity, gas, water, steam, and municipal services in accordance with current legislation.

Part of the revenue is used for the remuneration of workers and employees accepted to work in the cooperative under labor agreements. The remaining revenue is earmarked for the remuneration of members of the cooperative in proportion with the each member's individual contribution to the generation of that revenue, and can also be used, according to established norms, for the development of the cooperative's economic activity.

17. By resolution of its members' general meeting, the cooperative may allocate part of its funds to state and cooperative enterprises and organizations for the construction of projects for production, housing, cultural, and consumer service purposes on joint-venture principles [na dolevykh nachalakh].

V. Labor Organization, Remuneration, and Discipline [subhead]

18. All work in the cooperative is performed by its members' labor.

The employment of specialists and other workers under labor agreements is allowed when relevant specialists are lacking in the cooperative or when any works scheduled under plans or contracts cannot be performed by members of the cooperative alone within the set time.

19. The cooperative ensures the fully rational utilization of cooperative members' labor on the basis of team contracts and other advanced forms of labor organization.

Output and work assessment norms are elaborated and, whenever necessary, reviewed with broad participation by the cooperative members, taking into account the specific conditions of economic activity, and are approved by the cooperative's general meeting.

The cooperatives base their labor remuneration calculations on current wage rates, salary scales, and labor cost normatives established for the relevant sectors of the national economy and types of activity.

20. The duration and organization of the working day in the cooperative, the rules governing rest days, and the workers' minimum labor participation in the social economy are regulated by current labor legislation and the cooperative's internal Regulations.

The cooperative ensures the prompt payment of any earnings credited to its members not more than once monthly.

21. On the basis of the present Statute the cooperative elaborates its internal Regulations, which are approved by the general meeting of its members.

22. All work in the cooperative is performed with due observance of established rules and norms on equipment safety and the demands of production hygiene.

23. Members of the cooperative are entitled to remuneration according to the year's results by way of distribution of part of the actual residual surplus of revenues earned by the cooperative, depending on the personal contribution made by each member of the cooperative to the generation of that revenue and with a bonus system being introduced for those working under labor agreements.

The cooperative's general meeting has the right to introduce differentials in the remuneration of individual cooperative members according to the quantity and quality of labor.

The general meeting of the members of the cooperative applies appropriate incentive measures for the achievement of high production results, the elaboration and introduction of rationalization suggestions, savings on social funds, impeccable work, and other services to the cooperative.

24. The general meeting of the cooperative may impose punishment on any persons guilty of breaching labor discipline or the Statute and internal Regulations.

The general meeting of the cooperative may impose penalties on the cooperative's chairman, the chief (senior) bookkeeper, and the chairman and members of the auditing commission.

The procedure for the imposition and lifting of penalties is laid down by the internal Regulations.

Expulsion from membership of the cooperative can be effected by the general meeting of the collective.

Expulsion from membership of the cooperative can be effected by the general meeting as an extreme measure against persons systematically in breach of labor discipline or the cooperative Statute.

25. Labor disputes between members of the cooperative are examined by the general meeting of the cooperative.

VI. Social Security of Members of the Cooperative [subhead]

26. Members of the cooperative and persons working in the cooperative under labor agreements (if they have no other main occupation) are subject to state social security; the cooperative will make the appropriate payments to the state social security fund at the rates set for the state organizations and enterprises.

The cooperative makes reimbursement for any material loss suffered through its fault by any member of the cooperative as a result of injury, other damage to health, or death in the course of the performance of his labor obligations, and also investigates the causes of any accident with the participation of a representative from the relevant trade union organ.

27. Social, cultural, and consumer service facilities for members of the cooperatives are provided by USSR Gosssnab territorial organs and by enterprises (organizations) that have concluded contracts with the cooperative, thus giving members of the cooperative the right to use their medical and preventive medicine institutions, clubs, kindergartens, creches, young pioneer camps, and other facilities.

VII. Management Organs and Auditing Commission [subhead]

28. The management of the cooperative's affairs takes place on the basis of broad democracy and active participation by its members in the solution of all questions.

The cooperative's affairs are managed by the general meetings of its members and, in the periods between meetings, by the cooperative's board and its chairman.

The economic and financial activity of the cooperative's board and officials is monitored by an auditing commission elected for a period not exceeding 2 years. The auditing commission elects a chairman from among its members.

A cooperative board and auditing commission are elected by cooperatives with a minimum of 30 members. Those with a membership of fewer than 30 persons elect only a chairman and trustee auditor.

29. The general meeting of members of the cooperative is the cooperative's supreme management organ.

The general meeting adopts the cooperative Statute and effects any amendments or additions; elects the cooperative board (chairman) and its auditing commission (trustee auditor); decides on questions on admission to and expulsion from the collective; adopts internal Regulations; approves any contracts concluded with client enterprises (organizations) and examines and approves the cooperative's plans as elaborated by the board; approves the income and expenditure accounts and the norms for output; assessment and remuneration of labor by members of the cooperative; examines and approves expenditure not covered by the budget and defines sources for recouping any expenses incurred for this purpose; hears reports from the board (chairman) and the auditing commission (trustee auditor) of the cooperative on their activity; approves the annual plan report; decides the question of terminating the cooperative's activity.

30. The general meeting of cooperative members is convened at times set by the meeting itself, but not more than twice yearly.

The board (chairman) of the cooperative must convene a general meeting not later than 1 month following the end of the financial year to examine and approve the annual plan report.

The general meeting can legally make decisions provided the meeting is attended by at least two-thirds of cooperative members.

Decisions at the general meeting of the members of the cooperative are made by simple majority of votes in a show of hands [otkrytym golosovaniyem].

Any decisions by the general meeting contrary to the cooperative model Statute and current legislation are liable to be countermanded by the appropriate USSR Gossoznab territorial organ.

31. The auditing commission (trustee auditor) elected by the general meeting monitors observance of the cooperative's Regulations and the contracts concluded with state enterprises, the safekeeping of cooperative property, the legality of contracts and economic operations, the acquisition and expenditure of material, technical, and monetary funds, the correctness of accounting, plan reports, and calculations, the prompt and correct examination by the cooperative's board and officials of complaints and reports from members of the cooperative, and the safeguarding of other interests of the cooperative and its members.

The auditing commission (trustee auditor) conducts each year at least one audit of the cooperative's economic and financial activities, periodically inspects the economic activity of production subdivisions, and gives its conclusion on the cooperative's annual plan report. The audit reports are subject to approval by the general meeting of members of the cooperative.

The auditing commission (trustee auditor) has the right: to inspect the proper utilization and safekeeping of the cooperative's material, technical, and monetary funds, premises, equipment, transportation means, and other property; to demand from cooperative officials and members any documents needed for inspection; to submit proposals based on the results of inspections and audits for examination by the general meeting of the cooperative.

32. The board (chairman) of the cooperative and the auditing commission (trustee auditor) are elected by secret ballot.

Persons holding positions involving material responsibility cannot be elected to the auditing commission.

33. The board (chairman) of the cooperative conducts the day-to-day management of the cooperative's activity, ensures the fulfillment of decisions by the general meeting and board, represents the cooperative in relations with state organs and other institutions and organizations, and is responsible for the production, financial, and economic activity of the cooperative.

The board elects a chairman and one or two deputy chairmen of the cooperative board from among its members.

The board (chairman) of the cooperative divides the work among subdivisions and appoints their leaders.

34. The cooperative appoints from among its qualified members or under a labor agreement a senior bookkeeper, depending on the number of cooperative members.

The chief (senior) bookkeeper is directly subordinate to the board (chairman). Methodological leadership and monitoring of the cooperative's work on questions concerning the organization of bookkeeping, compilation of plan reports, and conduct of financial operations is provided by local financial organs and the appropriate services of the USSR Gosstat territorial organ.

35. In the event that the chairman and members of the cooperative board or the chairman and members of the auditing commission fail to justify the trust of the cooperative members, they can be recalled ahead of time by decision of the general meeting.

The cooperative's chairman may be temporarily suspended from duty by decision of the auditing commission. In such an event, a general meeting must be convened within not more than 5 days to decide the question of the chairman's recall ahead of time.

VIII. Adoption and Registration of the Cooperative's Regulations [subhead]

36. The Regulations of the cooperative, adopted by the general meeting of its members on the basis of this model Statute, should be registered with the rayispolkom (gorispolkom). The same procedure applies to subsequent amendments and additions to the Statute.

The registered Regulations of the cooperative are kept at the cooperative and at the rayispolkom (gorispolkom).

IX. Termination of the Cooperative's Activity [subhead]

37. The cooperative goes into liquidation:

In the event of systematic breach of legislation or of the cooperative's Regulations or systematic nonfulfillment of conditions and obligations stemming from contracts concluded with any enterprise or organization where secondary raw materials are generated, procured, or utilized;

Whenever the collective's membership falls below 5 members, unless minimum membership is restored within 1 month;

Whenever economic activity is carried on at a loss.

The cooperative goes into liquidation by decision of the general meeting of the members of the cooperative, or at the recommendation of the USSR Gosstat territorial organ following a decision by the rayispolkom (gorispolkom).

38. The general meeting of the members of the cooperative that passes a resolution on the cooperative's liquidation elects a liquidation commission, and whenever the cooperative goes into liquidation by decision of the gorispolkom, the latter appoints a liquidation commission.

39. Following the repayment of debts owed by a cooperative in liquidation according to established procedure, any funds remaining from the unexpended part of its revenue are distributed among former members of the cooperative according to procedures established by the general meeting. Any premises, facilities, machines, equipment, and other property that the cooperative used or rented are returned to their owners in good order.

UZBEK CP CENTRAL COMMITTEE EXPELS OFFICIALS

PM301605 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 5 Oct 86 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report on Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The third Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Plenum was held 4 October 1986. I.V. Usmanhodzhayev, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report entitled "Republic Party Organizations' Tasks To Further Increase the Effectiveness of Ideological Work in the Light of the Demands of the 27th CPSU Congress."

The following spoke in the debates on the report: M.M. Aripdzhayev, first secretary of Andizhan party obkom; V.F. Satin, first secretary of Tashkent party gorkom; P.S. Maksudov, director of the Uzbek Refractory Metals Combine; S. Mamrasulov, first secretary of Surkhan-Darya party obkom; R.N. Ivanushkina, machinest at the Karshi Sewn Goods Production Association named for the 50th anniversary of the USSR; U. Kunazarov, first secretary of Chimbayskiy party raykom in the Kara-kalpak ASSR; V.A. Golovin, chairman of the Uzbek SSR KGB; D. Dadazhanova, first secretary of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee; R. Khudaybergenova, chairman of Khorezm Oblispolkom; Kh. Usmanova, director of No. 2 Secondary School in Fergana Oblast's Kuvinskiy Rayon; G.G. Neklessa, editor of PRAVDA VOSTOKA; and S.N. Naimova, party committee secretary of "Yesh Leninchi" Kolkhoz in Navoi Oblast's Kyzyltepinskiy Rayon.

Yu.a. Sklyarov, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Section, delivered a speech at the plenum.

V.P. Anishchev, second secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a briefing on the Central Committee's long-term plan of work in 1986-1990 to fulfill the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 21st Uzbek Communist Party Congress.

The following took part in the discussion of this question: T.A. Alimov, first secretary of Tashkent party obkom; Yu.S. Vasilyev, second secretary of Samarkand partyobkom; and U. Ismailov, tractor driver at the "Kagan" Sovkhoz in Bukhara Oblast's Kaganskiy Rayon.

The plenum adopted appropriate resolutions on the questions under discussion.

The plenum examined organizational questions. V.I. Ogarok, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, was elected member of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. V.K. Mikhaylov was relieved of his duties as candidate member of the Central Committee Bureau.

In connection with the introduction of a permanent post of chief of the Construction and Municipal Services Section, Central Committee Secretary V.N. Lobko, who was at the same time acting chief of the section, has been relieved of these duties.

The following have been approved as chiefs of Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Sections: Z.A. Batyrov as chief of the Construction and Municipal Services Section; V.Yu. Zorin as chief of the Trade and Consumer Services Section; and A.S. Voyekov, as chief of the Transport and Communications Section.

N.V. Dukhanov, former first secretary of Navoi party gorkom, and M. Sherkulov, former first secretary of Samarkandskiy party raykom, were expelled from the Central Committee for serious shortcomings in their work and for having compromised themselves through incorrect actions.

V.I. Bessarabov, sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee Party Organizational Work Section, took part in the plenum's work.

With this the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Plenum ended its work.

UKRAINIAN CP CC CRITICIZES OBLAST AUTHORITIES

AU281550 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 22 Oct 86 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has listened to a report by Donetsk Oblispolkom on the progress made in restructuring the work performed in the oblast to accelerate the comprehensive development of the economy and of the sociocultural sphere in line with the 27th CPSU Congress decisions. The adopted decision notes that the oblast soviets of people's deputies have begun to handle big socioeconomic tasks in a more concrete manner. Democratic principles and publicity in their activity are widening, and they are relying better on the organs of voluntary public activity and on the working people's opinion. In its work, the oblispolkom has put more emphasis on rendering practical assistance to executive committees of the city, rayon, settlement, and village soviets of people's deputies.

At the same time, the decision points out that the restructuring of the work performed by the oblispolkom, by its numerous sections and administrations, and by rayispolkom and gorispolkoms is progressing slowly and is running into various organizational obstacles and into the adherence of the apparatus to formal and bureaucratic methods of administration. Many officials lack self-criticism in assessing the state of affairs, explain their omissions by objective difficulties, and underestimate the experience of other oblasts. The practice of orchestrating [zaorganizavannost] soviet sessions is still going on, an atmosphere of high exactingness is not ubiquitous, and principled businesslike criticism from below is practically nonexistent. The deputies are seldom briefed on the progress made in complying with their proposals and remarks.

The comprehensive development of cities, rayons, and enterprises has not been ensured everywhere. Administrative organs and their planning commissions accept numerous corrections made to lower the plans, and do not render effective assistance to lagging collectives. More than one-third of enterprises are falling short of contracted commitments. The level of industrialization in capital construction is low. No real persistence has been displayed in intensifying cultivation of grain, and livestock productivity is still low. Leaders and specialists of the oblast agro-industrial committee, Comrade S.V. Esin, oblispolkom first deputy chairman, personally, and many rayon agro-industrial associations still have not restructured their work, gravitate toward pencil pushing in administration, are poorly acquainted with the real situation, and do not take effective steps to improve it.

The oblast lacks a clear-cut program for settling the housing problem. Communal service, trade, city transport, and municipal service administrations are slow in restructuring their work. [paragraph continues]

Local industries and subsidiary farms run by enterprises have been developing poorly, the kolkhozes and sovkhoses have neglected trade at marketplaces. There is a significant lag in developing paid services to the population. The production of consumer goods per R1 of the wage fund is the smallest in the republic. Comrades V. T. Grishin and Ye. I. Koryagin, oblispolkom deputy chairmen responsible for this sector of work, do not have a deep insight into social problems and pay too little attention to long-term development.

The obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms are slow to perfect the forms and methods of party leadership over the activity of soviets. Insufficient progress has been made in increasing the responsibility of party-affiliated deputies and basic party organizations in the apparatus for promoting new attitudes, encouraging criticisms, and ensuring the final results of work.

Donetsk Oblispolkom and Comrade A.S. Statinov, chairman, personally have been asked to take concrete steps to eliminate the existing shortcomings and omissions, to critically examine the progress made in restructuring by each section and administration, and by executive committees of city, rayon, settlement, and village soviets.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has obligated Donetsk Obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms, in line with the CPSU Central Committee decision on further perfecting party leadership in soviets, to eradicate the practice of petty tutelage and of substituting soviets, and to see to it that party groups within soviets more fully exert their control functions with regard to communist deputies. It is essential to review the composition of administrative cadres with an eye on their ability to reform while on the job and to accomplish the new task, and to reinforce sectors wherever it is necessary. Practical assistance is to be given to basic party organizations in the apparatus of soviet executive committees, their sections and administrations to strengthen their influence on restructuring efforts.

Measures have been examined to further promote fine arts in the republic and to strengthen their material technical base. Party and administrative organs and creative unions have been asked to raise by all means the ideological and artistic level of fine arts, to cultivate an atmosphere of high mutual exactingness in creative circles, to improve work among young artists, and to see to it that painters and architects are more active in shaping the features of cities and villages and in improving the aesthetic qualities of industrial products. Provisions have been made to build artistic production combines in Vinnitsa and Kharkov, to reconstruct artists' houses in Lvov and Kharkov, and to improve working conditions for artists and architects.

The Central Committee has approved the conditions submitted by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers for republic-level socialist competitions among collectives of construction assembly, and specialized organizations to commission important production capacities and facilities on or ahead of schedule.

MOSCOW'S DEMICHEV GIVES STATE AWARDS IN KREMLIN

LD040016 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Petr Demichev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, USSR Supreme Soviet first deputy chairman presented state awards to a group of comrades in the Kremlin today. [passage omitted] Comrade Demichev warmly congratulated those awarded on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR 30 OCT - 2 NOV

LD030207 [Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, unless otherwise indicated, on 30 October - 2 November. GMT times of broadcasts are given in parentheses at the end of each item.

30 October

Mechanizers of Kazakhstan are completing the autumn preparation of land for the next year's harvest. In the republic it is planned to plow on almost 20 million fallow hectares. To date 19 million of them have been prepared for autumn sowing.

Eight oblasts of 19 over-fulfilled the set tasks for autumn plowing. Compared to the last year, the pace of plowing is considerably higher. (1200)

31 October

Over 130 farms in Uzbekistan selling cotton to the state are above the plan, but our correspondent writes that an extremely small amount of cotton has been procured in Kashkadarya and Bukhara Oblasts. (0900)

1 November

The cotton growers of Fergana Oblast in Uzbekistan today fulfilled their annual plan for the sale of raw cotton to the state; 546,000 metric tons have been delivered to procurement points. The cotton harvest is continuing in all farms of Fergana Oblast. (1530)

Kaluga Oblast has sold 136,000 metric tons of grain to the state. (1900)

The North Ossetian ASSR has sold the state 185,000 metric tons of grain, thereby fulfilling the plan for grain sales to the state. (1900)

2 November

Donetsk Oblast: The horticultural and market-garden associations of the oblast have produced over 50,000 metric tons of fruit and vegetables. Tula Oblast: The sugar refineries have received more than 620,000 metric tons of beets. (0900)

STATISTICS UPDATE PROGRESS OF GRAIN HARVESTING

LD300950 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0100 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Overcoming the bad weather, farmers of the Urals and the Preduralye are completing the harvest of grains in the fields. In the country as a whole, according to the latest figures of the USSR Central Statistical Administration grains have been reaped and threshed on more than 106 million hectares.

The harvesting of a number of late crops is coming to a close as well. Thus rice has been harvested on 96 percent of the area allotted to it. Combines are now working on rice fields in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, where late ripening strains are being grown. Harvesting of corn for grain is under way in Georgia, as this crop remains to be threshed on a small area in other southern republics as well. In the Preduralye, South Urals, and Volga regions, threshing of sunflowers continues, and this crop overall has been harvested on 88 percent of the total area.

In Maritime Kray and a number of other places farmers are harvesting soya. This remains to be harvested on about one-eighth of plantations. By the start of this week, the plan for harvesting of raw cotton had been fulfilled by 80 percent. Scutching of flax been almost completed on farms. This year a fairly good potato crop has been grown. Its harvesting has been nearly completed. Work continues on winter crop fields. The sowing plan has been fulfilled by 95 percent. Experts note that the rains of the past few days in the south of the European part of the country have greatly improved conditions for promoting crop growth. Plowing of fallows is going somewhat faster than last year, with more than 102 million hectares having been plowed.

Latest Grain Harvesting

PM031551 [Editorial Report] Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 31 October 1986 carries on page 1 under the headline "Weighty Harvest Results. Everything That Has Been Grown Must Be Gathered and Stored!" a 1,200-word report by Yu. Shchelkanova, deputy chief of the Krasnoyarsk CPSU Kraykom Agriculture and Food Industry Section, datelined Krasnoyarsk Kray.

The item is introduced by the following SELSKAYA ZHIZN boxed note in boldface:

"The grain crops harvest is approaching its end, and the results of labor are gratifying. Much more grain was harvested this year than last year.

"As usual, the work done by agricultural working people in Kuban was excellent: They performed their stepped-up pledges by delivering 4.3 million metric tons of grain to the motherland's granaries. Kazakhstan's kolkhozes and sovkhozes were credited with more than 16 million metric tons of grain -- which is in excess of plan -- and the Orenburg region's crop farmers have been credited with 3.46 million metric tons. Good harvests were reaped by farm collectives in most union and autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts. Many thanks to them all!

"Kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers in Altay Kray and in Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts made a weighty contribution to grain resources. Today we publish a report from Krasnoyarsk Kray, where the gathering of crops seems to be the culmination of harvesting work in the Siberian region and the country as a whole."

According to Shchelkanova, "fall plowing has been done on 2.1 million hectares and seeds have been laid in, one-half of which are already in a fit condition for sowing. The kray's farms have also fulfilled the first commandment, having delivered 1.25 million metric tons of high-quality Siberian grain to the state granaries."

The remainder of Shchelkanova's report deals with rayon and farm level achievements in Krasnoyarsk Kray.